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1. INTRODUCTION
Amid a 2007 dispute with Russia, Estonia suffered a series of distributed
denial-of-service (DDoS) cyber-attacks that disabled the websites of
government ministries, political parties, news outlets, banks, and other firms for
t Yale Law School, J.D. expected 2014; Johns Hopkins University, M.A. 2009; Johns
Hopkins University, B.A. 2007.
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several weeks.' The attacks employed digital "bots" to overload Estonia's
Internet infrastructure with an overwhelming stream of data packets, which
caused serious service and communications disruptions before abruptly coming
to a halt. 2 During the initial stages, Estonia's Computer Emergency Response
Team (E-CERT) traced the attacks to I.P. addresses3 belonging to Russian
nationalist groups, but was unable to establish direct participation by Moscow.4
Subsequent evidence suggested, however, that the attacks were tied to the
Kremlin.5
The range of lawful responses available to Estonia depended on whether
the DDoS cyber-campaign could be categorized as an "armed attack," which
would have permitted self-defense under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter.6 As a
member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Estonia could also
have invoked Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty in response to an armed
attack, obliging allies to assist with measures that would include, if necessary,
the use of force in collective self-defense.7 If these attacks did not constitute an
"armed attack," however, Estonia's response would have been limited to non-
forceful countermeasures.8
There are several approaches to examining the question of when cyber-
attacks rise to the level of armed attacks that would permit self-defense. These
have coalesced around an "effects-based" approach that measures the severity
of the direct and foreseeable consequences of a cyber-attack in order to
1. See Ian Traynor, Russia Accused of Unleashing Cyberwar To Disable Estonia, GUARDIAN
(London), May 16, 2007, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/may/17/topstories3.russia; War in the
FifIh Domain: Are the Mouse and Keyboard the New Weapons ofConflict?, ECONOMIsT, July 1, 2010,
http://www.economist.com/node/1 6478792.
2. See, e.g., Joshua Davis, Hackers Take Down the Most Wired Country in Europe, WIRED,
Aug. 21, 2007, http://www.wired.com/politics/security/magazine/15-09/ff estonia. The term "bot"
refers to software applications that automate various web-based tasks, ranging from overloading servers
with traffic to improving online search results. See, e.g., Jennifer Slegg, AdSense Mediapartners Bot
Adding to the Google Search Index, JENSENSE (Apr. 16, 2008, 1:08 AM), http://www.jensense.com
/2006/04/16/adsense-mediapartners-bot-adding-to-the-google-search-index.
3. An I.P. address is a numerical label assigned to each device connected to the Internet. It
serves both to identify the device and to indicate its location to other devices.
4. Davis, supra note 2; see also Arthur Bright, Estonia Accuses Russia of "Cyberattack,"
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, May 17, 2007, http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0517/p99sOl-duts.html
(discussing the difficulty of proving the Russian government's involvement).
5. See Charles Clover, Kremlin-Backed Group Behind Estonia Cyber Blitz, FIN. TIMES,
Mar. 11, 2009, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/57536d5a-Oddc-llde-8ea3-0000779fd2ac.html ("Konstantin
Goloskokov, a 'commissar' in the youth group Nashe, which works for the Kremlin, told the Financial
Times that he and some associates had launched the attack, which appears to be the first time anyone has
claimed responsibility.").
6. See U.N. Charter art. 51 (recognizing "the inherent right of individual or collective self-
defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations" as an exception to Article
2(4)'s prohibition on the threat or use of force).
7. North Atlantic Treaty art. 5, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243.
8. See Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Rep. of
the Int'l Law Comm'n, 53d Sess., Apr. 23-June 1, July 2-Aug. 10, 2001, art. 22, U.N. Doc. A/56/10;
GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10 (2001) [hereinafter Draft Articles] (declaring an act that would
otherwise violate an international obligation to be permissible if it is undertaken as a countermeasure);
Katherine C. Hinkle, Countermeasures in the Cyber Contest: One More Thing To Worry About, 37
YALE J. INT'L L. ONLINE, 11 (2010), http://www.yjil.org/docs/pub/o-37-hinkle-countermeasures-in-the
-cyber-context.pdf (offering a full discussion of Estonia's countermeasure options).
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determine whether such an attack can ever constitute an armed attack.9 The
prevailing consensus among scholars and policymakers holds that, because
DDoS attacks cause neither physical injury nor destruction, they can never
constitute armed attacks that trigger self-defense rights.' 0 But such a view is
mistaken.
This Note draws upon an analogy between Internet denial and naval
blockades to demonstrate that DDoS attacks could meet the requirements of
armed attacks, and analyzes the conditions under which they would. Much like
Internet denial, naval blockades are illegal uses of force designed to inhibit
access to a common medium that can, without proximately causing physical
injury or destruction, so seriously jeopardize a nation's well-being that they rise
to the level of armed attacks." In addition to constituting armed attacks,
determining whether, and to what extent, DDoS attacks trigger self-defense
rights requires applying principles of necessity and proportionality. This Note
allays anxiety over the abuse of self-defense rights by demonstrating that
adherence to necessity and proportionality will limit self-defense responses to
within reasonable bounds. The Note ends by comparing the proposed self-
defense approach to alternative ways of dealing with DDoS attacks to show that
self-defense best promotes international peace and security.
The argument proceeds in five parts. Part II of this Note presents an
overview of the right of self-defense in international law. It focuses on the
development of the necessity and proportionality principles and on the armed
attack requirement of the post-U.N. Charter era. Part III outlines perspectives
on if, and how, cyber-attacks can constitute armed attacks under Article 51 of
the U.N. Charter, placing emphasis on the effects-based approach. Though this
Note endorses the effects-based approach in the abstract, it argues that the
dominant "kinetic effect equivalence" interpretation is misguided.12 Part IV
9. See, e.g., JEFFREY CARR, INSIDE CYBER WARFARE: MAPPING THE CYBER UNDERWORLD
59-60 (2010).
10. See, e.g., Oona Hathaway et al., The Law of Cyber-Attack, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 817, 848
(2012) (declaring that the effects-based approach would not consider a cyber-attack against websites to
be an armed attack unless it caused "physical injury or property damage"); Michael N. Schmitt,
Computer Network Attack and the Use of Force in International Law: Thoughts on a Normative
Framework, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 885, 935 (1999) (concluding that "[t]o constitute an armed
attack, the [cyber-attack] must be intended to directly cause physical damage to tangible objects or
injury to human beings"); Could Cyber Skirmish Lead U.S. to War?, NBCNEWS.COM: REDTAPE
CHRONICLES (June 11, 2010, 9:00 AM), http://redtape.nbcnewscom/_news/2010/06/l1/6345590-could
-cyber-skirmish-lead-us-to-war (stating that self-defense is likely permissible only in response to "a
cyber attack on a country's power networks or critical infrastructure (that) resulted in casualties and
destruction comparable to an armed attack" (quoting Eneken Tikk of the NATO Cooperative Cyber
Defense Centre of Excellence)).
11. See Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res. 29/3314, Annex, art. 3(c), U.N. Doc.
A/RES/29/3314 (Dec. 14, 1974) (enumerating naval blockade as an "act of aggression" under Article 3);
TOM RUYS, 'ARMED ATTACK' AND ARTICLE 51 OF THE UN CHARTER: EVOLUTIONS IN CUSTOMARY
LAW AND PRACTICE 130 (2011) (arguing that the Definition of Aggression was intended to define
"armed attack" under Article 51 of the Charter).
12. "Kinetic effect equivalence" refers to the requirement that a cyber-attack have an effect
equivalent to an attack with conventional "kinetic" weapons-that is, foreseeably causing physical
injury and destruction-before rising to the level of an armed attack. See Michael N. Schmitt, Cyber
Operations and the Jus ad Bellum Revisited, 56 VILL. L. REV. 569, 588 (2011) ("Clearly, an armed
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proposes analogizing Internet disruptions to naval blockades. It demonstrates
that DDoS attacks that violate a nation's right of common access to cyberspace
are analogous to blockades that violate its right of common access to the sea.
Because blockades with sufficiently serious impacts on a nation's welfare can
constitute armed attacks, DDoS attacks with equivalent consequences may do
so as well. Part IV develops metrics to determine whether a DDoS attack meets
the armed-attack criteria, applies those metrics to the 2007 DDoS campaign
against Estonia, and concludes that an armed attack did indeed take place. Part
V examines the principles of necessity and proportionality to explore how they
limit the scope of self-defense against DDoS attacks that meet the armed-attack
threshold in general, as well as in the context of the 2007 attacks against
Estonia. It also considers the problem of attribution when attempting to assign
responsibility to cyber-attacks mounted by nonstate actors who may be
supported or guided by governments. Part VI analyzes the approach outlined in
this Note from a normative perspective and argues that the proposed approach
better serves international peace and security than its alternatives-non-
response or "active defense" countermeasures.
II. THE RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE
Self-defense has justified the use of force since antiquity.' 3 In the early
modem period, scholars conceived of self-defense as a natural right, the use of
which was meant to redress injuries against the state's sovereign rights.14 Hugo
Grotius feared that self-defense would be used as a pretext for aggression and
argued that it could only be lawfully exercised against assailants if the threat of
injury were immediate or certain. 5 However, these principles were rarely
applied throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries; instead, war was
often viewed as a legitimate political tool.' 6
A. Self-Defense Under Customary International Law
The imposition of legal limits on the right of self-defense began with the
Caroline case,'7 which established that self-defense must be limited to
instances in which "necessity of [that] self-defence [is] instant, overwhelming,
attack includes kinetic military force. Applying the consequence-based approach, an armed attack must
also be understood in terms of the effects typically associated with the term 'armed.").
13. See, e.g., MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, ON THE COMMONWEALTH AND ON THE LAWS (James
E. Zetzel ed., 1999).
14. See STANIMIR A. ALEXANDROV, SELF-DEFENSE AGAINST THE USE OF FORCE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 6-7 (1996) (listing Alberico Gentili, Francisco de Victoria, Balthazar Ayala,
Francisco Suarez, Christian Wolff, and Emerich de Vattel as scholars who adopted a natural rights
conception of self-defense).
15. HUGO GROTIUS, THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE, bk. II §§ 3, 5, at 72-73 (Louise R. Loomis
trans., Walter J. Black 1949) (1625).
16. See, e.g., ALEXANDROV, supra note 14, at 10; CARL VON CLAUSEWITz, ON WAR, bk. 1,
ch. 1, at 87 (Michael Howard & Peter Paret eds. & trans., Princeton Univ. Press 1984) (1832) (stating
famously that war is a mere continuation of policy by other means).
17. See R.Y. Jennings, The Caroline and McLeod Cases, 32 AM. J. INT'L L. 82, 82 (1938) ("It
was in the Caroline case that self-defence was changed from a political excuse to a legal doctrine.").
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leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation."' 8 This translates
into the necessity requirement, which holds that armed self-defense is
permissible only if alternative measures are insufficient to-defend a threatened
sovereign right.19 The Caroline doctrine also recognizes that, because acts
taken in self-defense are "justified by the necessity of self-defence, [they] must
be limited by that necessity, and kept clearly within it."20 This becomes the
proportionality requirement, which limits the scope of self-defense to that
which is necessary to defeat the threat. 21
Claud Waldock summarizes the post-Caroline requirements to activate
the right of self-defense under customary international law to be: an
infringement of a state's sovereign right, the failure of the offending state to
halt the infringement, and the satisfaction of necessity and proportionality. 22
The twentieth century witnessed additional international conventions limiting
the scope of lawful self-defense. For example, the Hague Convention of 1907
outlawed the use of military force to defend the right of debt collection,23 while
the renunciation of war as an instrument of policy in the 1928 Kellogg-Briand
24Pact further limited self-defense to be permissible only against aggression.
The most recent and strongest treaty-based limitation on self-defense can be
found in the U.N. Charter. 25
B. Self-Defense Under the U.N. Charter
Articles 2(4) and 51 of the U.N. Charter govern the modem law of self-
defense.26 Article 2(4) requires member states to refrain "from the threat or use
of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or
18. Id. at 89 (quoting Letter from Daniel Webster, U.S. Sec'y of State, to British Foreign
Secretary, Lord Ashburton, British Foreign Sec'y (Jul. 27, 1842), in 30 BRITISH AND FOREIGN STATE
PAPERS 193).
19. See Sean D. Murphy, The International Legality of US Military Cross-Border Operations
from Afghanistan into Pakistan, 85 INT'L L. STUD. (U.S. NAVAL WAR COL.) 109, 127 (2009) (noting
that "the International Court of Justice and scholars typically first consider whether there are peaceful
alternatives to self-defense, such as pursuing available diplomatic avenues" when assessing whether the
use of force is necessary).
20. Jennings, supra note 17, at 89 (quoting Letter from Daniel Webster, U.S. Sec'y of State, to
Lord Ashburton (Jul. 27, 1842), in 30 BRITISH AND FOREIGN STATES PAPERS,193).
21. See Judith Gail Gardam, Proportionality and Force in International Law, 87 AM. J. INT'L
L. 391, 403 (1993) (affirming proportionality as an "essential component" of self-defense).
22. CLAUD H.M. WALDOCK, THE REGULATION OF THE USE OF FORCE BY INDIVIDUAL STATES
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 463-64 (1952).
23. Convention Respecting the Limitation of the Employment of Force for the Recovery of
Contract Debts art. 1, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2241, U.N.T.S. 537 (prohibiting "recourse to armed force
for the recovery of contract debts claimed").
24. General Treaty Providing for the Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy
pmbl., art. I, Aug. 27, 1928, 46 Stat. 2343, 94 L.N.T.S. 57 [hereinafter Kellogg-Briand Pact] (declaring
that contracting parties renounce war as an instrument of policy and that those who "seek to promote
[their] national interests by resort to war should be denied the benefits furnished by this Treaty");
YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENSE 85-86 (2011) (noting that, while self-defense
was not explicitly mentioned, reading the preamble together with Article I permits self-defensive wars
against aggressors).
25. U.N. Charter art. 51.
26. DINSTEIN, supra note 24, at 189.
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in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations." 27
The prevailing view among scholars, which is supported by the travaux
prdparatoires of the Charter, is that Article 2(4)'s prohibition is confined to
armed force and does not apply to political, psychological, or economic
coercion, such as trade sanctions or propaganda. 2 8 By declaring that "[n]othing
in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective
self-defence if an armed attack occurs," 29 Article 51 carves out an exemption to
this prohibition and permits recourse to armed force in self-defense.
But Article 51 has been interpreted to sanction self-defense "if and only if
an armed attack occurs." 30 While all parties agree that Article 51 authorizes
self-defense against an armed attack, what precisely constitutes an armed attack
has not been defined.3' Early interpretations ranged from broad definitions
including single rifle shots, to narrow ones including only uses of force that
threaten state extinction. 32 The "single rifle shot" interpretation was based on a
literal reading of the term to mean any aggressive action that employs armed
force.33 This approach has largely been rejected and replaced by the view that
armed attack is a more restrictive term than "use of force." 34 Under this
approach, an attack must meet a gravity threshold before being considered an
Article 51 armed attack, even if that attack employs traditional weapons of
war.35
The gravity requirement can be traced to the 1986 Military and
Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua case, in which the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) attempted to define armed attacks as
grounds for legitimate self-defense. 36 The United States attempted to justify its
use of force against Nicaragua as collective self-defense of Costa Rica, El
Salvador, and Honduras against attacks by Nicaraguan bands.3 7 The ICJ
rejected the U.S. argument, and ruled that Nicaragua's actions were merely
"frontier incidents" that did not rise to the level of an armed attack. The Court
determined that only acts of aggression of sufficient "scale and effects"
constituted armed attacks.39 The 2003 Oil Platforms case affirmed this
27. U.N. Charter art. 2(4).
28. See, e.g., Albrecht Randelzhofer, Article 2(4), in THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS:
A COMMENDATORY 106, 112 (Bruno Simma ed., 1994); Edward Gordon, Article 2(4) in Historical
Context, 10 YALE J. INT'L. L. 271 (1985).
29. U.N. Charter art. 51.
30. DINSTEIN, supra note 24, at 196.
31. Christine Gray, The Use of Force and the International Legal Order, in INTERNATIONAL
LAW 589, 602 (Malcolm D. Evans ed., 2003) (noting that "what ... constitutes an armed attack
continues to elude concrete definition").
32. See ALEXANDROV, supra note 14, at 97.
33. Id. at 97-98.
34. Id.
35. INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL, RESOLUTION ON SELF-DEFENSE 2 (2007) (noting that
"[a]n armed attack triggering the right of self-defence must be of a certain degree of gravity").
36. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J.
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distinction. 40 The Court considered whether Iranian missiles and mining
activities, which damaged a U.S. flagged tanker and a naval frigate, constituted
an armed attack against which the United States could justifiably resort to
forceful self-defense. 4 1 The Court ruled that "[e]ven taken cumulatively, and
reserving . .. the question of Iranian responsibility, these incidents do not seem
to the Court to constitute an armed attack on the United States, of the kind that
the Court, in the [Nicaragua case], qualified as a 'most grave' form of the use
of force."42
The 1996 Nuclear Weapons Opinion contextualized the gravity
requirement when it identified the right to self-defense as an essential element
of the "fundamental right of every State to survival."4 3 Though the survival of a
state need not literally be on the line for self-defense to be permissible, the right
should be exercisable only against threats that meaningfully impact state
survival." The gravity requirement on which both the Nicaragua and the Oil
Platforms courts focused appears to serve as an indicator of whether the victim
state's fundamental right to survival has been sufficiently implicated to justify
self-defense. The Nuclear Weapons Opinion also denied that specific weapons
must be used to launch armed attacks under Article 51.45 This has led scholars
to conclude that the instrument of an armed attack is immaterial, and self-
defense can be employable against attacks using conventional or
unconventional weapons.46
In order for self-defense to be permissible, there must first be a violation
of a state's sovereign rights under international law. The violation must have
been an exercise of armed force in contravention of Article 2(4) of sufficient
scale and effect to constitute an armed attack. Finally, self-defense is lawful
only if it comports with necessity and proportionality requirements under
customary international law.47  Ohen considering whether self-defense is
permissible against cyber-attacks, such as the 2007 DDoS attack against
Estonia, scholars have focused their analysis on whether cyber-attacks bear
40. Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 J.C.J. 90, S 51 (Nov. 6).
41. Id.
42. Id.T64.
43. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226,
96 (July 8).
44. DINSTEIN, supra note 24, at 187 (agreeing that "self-defence is engendered by, and
embedded in, the fundamental right of States to survival" and recognizing that state extinction need not
be immediately on the line for self-defense to be applicable); id. ("The reality of self-
defence . . . transcends life-or-death existential crises . . . .").
45. Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. T 38-39 (declaring that Article 51 applies to "any use of
force, regardless of the weapons employed").
46. See Yoram Dinstein, Computer Network Attacks and Self-Defense, in COMPUTER
NETWORK ATTACK AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 99, 103 (Michael Schmitt & Brian O'Donnell eds.,
2002).
47. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986
I.C.J. 14, 1 194 (June 27); see also IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY
STATES 261-64 (1963) (affirming the proportionality requirement); Letter from Daniel Webster, U.S.
Sec'y of State, to Lord Ashburton (Aug. 6, 1842) (quoted in 2 JOHN BASSETT MOORE, A DIGEST OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 412 (1906)) (asserting that self-defense is limited to cases in which the "necessity
of that self-defence is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for
deliberation").
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sufficient resemblance to armed force so as to meet the armed-attack
requirement. 48
III. CYBER-ATTACKS AS ARMED ATTACKS
Though the drafters of the U.N. Charter never imagined the possibility of
warfare in cyberspace, the principles they established can nonetheless guide jus
ad bellum analysis of cyber-attacks. 49 Scholars and practitioners have sought to
determine whether and when cyber-attacks can be considered armed attacks
under Article 51. After presenting leading perspectives-the instrument-based,
target-based, and effects-based approachesso-and applying them to the 2007
DDoS attacks on Estonia, this Part critiques scholars' overemphasis on kinetic
consequence found in the dominant interpretation of the effect-based approach.
A. Three Approaches To Assessing Cyber-Attacks as Armed Attacks
The instrument-based approach holds that only traditional weapons with
physical characteristics can constitute armed force required to carry out armed
attacks.51 This approach does not consider offensive cyber operations,
including the 2007 attack against Estonia, to be capable of meeting the
requirements of armed attack.52 Though it is simple to apply, the high damage
potential of cyber-attacks has led many to criticize the instrument-based
approach as unable to meet modem national security challenges.53
Under the target-based approach (also called the strict liability approach),
"the nature of the target is vital in determining whether a [cyber-attack] rises to
the level of a use of force or an armed attack." 54 This approach classifies any
cyber-attack against "critical" national infrastructure as an armed attack that
may justify self-defense, regardless of its severity.55  As information
48. See, e.g., Schmitt, supra note 10, at 928-34.
49. COMPUTER SC. & TELECOMMS. BD., NAT'L RES. COUNCIL, TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, LAW,
AND ETHICS REGARDING U.S. ACQUISITION AND USE OF CYBERATTACK CAPABILITIES 4 (William A.
Owens et al. eds., 2009) [hereinafter NRC REPORT] (concluding that "the principles of the law of armed
conflict and the U.N. Charter-including both law governing the legality of going to war (jus ad
bellum), and law governing behavior during war (jus in bello)-do apply to cyber-attack," although
"new analytical work may be needed to understand how those principles do or should apply to
cyberweapons").
50. See David E. Graham, Cyber Threats and the Law of War, 4 J. NAT'L SEC. L. & POL'Y 87,
91(2010).
51. See Daniel B. Silver, Computer Network Attack as a Use of Force Under Article 2(4) of
the United Nations Charter, in COMPUTER NETWORK ATTACK AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 73, 88
(Michael Schmitt & Brian O'Donnell eds., 2002).
52. Schmitt, supra note 10, at 909.
53. See, e.g., Hathaway et al., supra note 10, at 846; Duncan B. Hollis, Why States Need an
International Law for Information Operations, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 1023, 1041-42 (2007); see
also Brian Palmer, How Dangerous Is a Cyberattack?, SLATE (Apr. 27, 2012, 6:13 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/newsandpoliticslexplainer/2012/04/how-dangerousisaecyberattack_.html
(describing the extent of damage that cyber-attacks can cause, the severest likely consequence being
prolonged power failure).
54. Eric Talbot Jensen, Computer Attacks on Critical National Infrastructure: A Use of Force
Invoking the Right to Self-Defense, 38 STAN. J. INT'L L. 207, 226 (2002).
55. See, e.g., WALTER GARY SHARP, SR., CYBERSPACE AND THE USE OF FORCE 129-31
(1999).
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infrastructure, telecommunications infrastructure, and financial institutions are
considered critical, the DDoS campaign against Estonia that targeted
telecommunications and banking sectors may well be considered an armed
attack by this approach.5
However, the target-based framework ignores the gravity requirement
prescribed by the ICJ. Even acts of cyber espionage against critical
infrastructure systems, which are legal under international law,57 can trigger the
right to self-defense, as the approach allows victims to infer hostile intent
presaging an imminent armed attack, and to lawfully respond in anticipatory
self-defense. This is dangerously overinclusive and risks catalyzing
retaliation and escalation over minor offenses.
The effects-based approach holds that a cyber-attack can be categorized
as an armed attack if the effect of the cyber-attack is equivalent to that of an
armed attack carried out by physical weapons.59 This view is the most
prominent among scholars and has been endorsed by the Departments of State
and Defense.60
The approach begins from the instrument-based position that only
military or armed force can cause armed attacks, but eschews the notion that
armed force is limited to physical weapons.61 Rather than permitting law to
become "ossified at the level of technology that existed at the end of World
War II[,]" this view adopts an evolving definition that permits non-physical
force-such as electronic jamming, directed-energy weapons, and cyber-
attacks-to fall under the umbrella of military force. 62 The effects-based
approach then considers whether a cyber-attack's consequences meet a
56. See U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION PLAN 17
(2006) (categorizing agriculiure, food, water, public health, emergency services, government, defense
industrial base, information and telecommunications, energy, transportation, banking and finance,
industry and hazardous material, and posting and shipping as critical infrastructure).
57. See G.N. Barrie, Spying-An International Law Perspective, 2008 J. S. AFR. L. 238, 249-
50 (noting that international law obtains no specific prohibition against peacetime espionage); Roger D.
Scott, Territorially Intrusive Intelligence Collection and International Law, 46 A.F.L. REV. 217, 220
(1999) (stating that while espionage is frequently criminalized under domestic statutes, "'[n]o serious
proposal has ever been made within the international community to prohibit intelligence collection as a
violation of international law"' (quoting W. Hays Parks, The International Law of Intelligence
Collection, in NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 433, 433-34 (John Norton Moore et al. eds., 1990))).
58. See SHARP, supra note 55, at 129-32; see also Sean M. Condron, Getting It Right:
Protecting American Critical Infrastructure in Cyberspace, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 403, 408 (2007)
(advocating, with qualification, "approach[ing] cyber security as a threat rather than as a criminal
matter").
59. See Schmitt, supra note 10, at 914-15.
60. See, e.g., Siobhan Gorman & Julian E. Barnes, Cyber Combat: Act of War, WALL ST. J.,
May 30, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SBI0001424052702304563104576355623135782718.html
(reporting on a Pentagon document that declares that the United States reserves the right to use physical
force to retaliate "[i]f a cyber-attack produces death, damage, destruction[,] or high-level disruption that
a traditional military attack would cause"); Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep't of State,
Remarks at the USCYBERCOM Inter-Agency Legal Conference: International Law in Cyberspace
(Sept. 18, 2012), http://www.state.gov/s//releases/remarks/197924.htm (affirming the right to self-
defense against cyber-attacks that meet certain effects and intent criteria).
61. See Dinstein, supra note 46, at 103; Silver, supra note 51, at 84.
62. Silver, supra note 51, at 84.
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"severity" of harm criterion-similar to the Nicaragua court's "gravity"
63
requirement-when assessing whether it qualifies as an armed attack.
Though effects-based proponents see "no reason to differentiate between
kinetic and electronic means of attack," they fixate on the differences between
kinetic and electronic effects.6 A consensus among effects-based scholars
holds that only cyber-attacks that proximately cause kinetic effect or physical
damage can qualify as armed attacks.65 Summarizing the position, Daniel
Silver writes that "physical injury or property damage must arise as a direct and
foreseeable consequence" of a cyber-attack before it can qualify as an armed
attack.6 The physical-effect requirement means that a cyber-attack that brings
down an airplane could qualify as an armed attack, but because DDoS attacks,
including the 2007 attack against Estonia, cause only non-physical effects, they
can never constitute an armed attack, regardless of the severity of their
consequences. Some effects-based scholars classify the 2007 attacks against
Estonia specifically as unlawful uses of force that would not rise to the level of
armed attacks.68 Others categorize the 2007 DDoS attacks as an unlawful
intervention.69 In either case, lawful armed self-defense would not be possible.
B. Trouble with the Kinetic Effect Fixation
The kinetic effect requirement for armed attack comes with a number of
problems. Non-physical consequences of cyber-attacks, including wiping out
financial records or disrupting telecommunication networks, can have
catastrophic effects on civil society. 70 If serious enough, such disruptions can
threaten states dependent upon digital infrastructure as much as kinetic
63. See Silver, supra note 51, at 89 (proposing severity as the determinant criterion when
assessing effect equivalence). Compare Schmitt, supra note 10, 914-15 (proposing a six-factor test that
includes severity, immediacy, invasiveness, directness, measurability, and presumptive legitimacy), with
Jason Barkham, Information Warfare and International Law on the Use of Force, 34 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L.
& POL. 57, 84-86 (2001) (criticizing Schmitt's test as unwieldy and subjective).
64. DINSTEIN, supra note 24, at 103.
65. Schmitt, supra note 12, at 588 (insisting upon kinetic effect as an essential component of
cyber-based armed attack); Silver, supra note 51, at 90-91 (arguing that a cyber-attack is an armed
attack "only if its foreseeable consequence is to cause physical injury or property damage and, even
then, only if the severity of those foreseeable consequences resembles the consequences that are
associated with armed coercion").
66. Silver, supra note 51, at 92; see also Schmitt, supra note 10, at 934-35 (requiring kinetic
effects for armed attacks, while also highlighting the importance of direct and proximate causation).
67. Hathaway et al., supra note 10, at 848.
68. For example, Michael Schmitt argues that "[h]ad Russia been held responsible for [cyber-
attacks against Estonia] under international law, it is likely that the international community would have
(or should have) treated them as a use of force in violation of the UN Charter and customary
international law." Schmitt, supra note 12, at 577. Schmitt later acknowledges that, while widespread
practice could shift the scope of self-defense to include non-destructive cyber-attacks of the sort carried
out against Estonia, such a shift has not yet occurred. Id. at 588.
69. See, e.g., Russell Buchan, Cyber Attacks: Unlawful Uses of Force or Prohibited
Interventions, 17 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 211, 214 (2012) (concluding that the 2007 cyber-attacks against
Estonia cannot be regarded as an unlawful use of force but rather should be considered "a violation of
the Estonian government's right to non-intervention").
70. Barack Obama, Taking the Cyberattack Threat Seriously, WALL ST. J., July 19, 2012,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000 8 7 2 396390444330904577535492693044650.html (noting that
non-physical cyber-attacks can nonetheless trigger financial crises or public health emergencies).
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weapons. 7 Prohibiting self-defense reduces the ability of states to deter and
defend against such activities, as legal countermeasures against uses of force or
interventions are likely to be inadequate and destabilizing. 72 These normative
considerations are addressed in greater detail in Part VI.
While effect-based scholars recognize that an evolving view of military
technology must permit non-kinetic offensive military capabilities to constitute
armed force, they limit this recognition to instrument of delivery. 73 This
myopic perspective ignores the reality that military technology has also evolved
to produce non-kinetic effects. For example, modem suppression of enemy air
defense (SEAD) and electronic attack (EA) operations can include either
kinetic effect-causing missiles or electronic jamming that produce no kinetic or
physical consequences.74 Because the effects of offensive military capability
have changed in addition to its instruments, effects-based analysis should adapt
beyond the state of the art circa 1945. Stephanie Handler points this out in a
2012 article in which she questions the logic of treating combat-enabling cyber-
attacks that do not produce kinetic effects, such as disabling enemy air defenses
with a virus, differently from attacks that knock out those systems with missiles
or bombs, even though both methods yield identical battlefield results.75
Though it may be argued that it is easier to bring systems disabled with non-
kinetic effect producing attacks back online, this is not necessarily the case, as
the software components of many modem systems have become more critical
and more costly than hardware. More importantly, post-conflict reparability is
hardly a sound basis to make a legal distinction regarding the permissibility of
self-defense.
Kinetic-effect enthusiasts may argue that, while intellectually
unsatisfying, the distinction is nonetheless necessary because activities causing
neither physical injury nor property destruction are simply too far removed
from what the framers of the U.N. Charter envisioned as qualifying as an armed
attack.76 This is a weak argument. Being outside the imagination of Charter
framers has not prevented novel forms of aggression, including attacks on
space assets and attacks committed by nonstate actors, from falling under the
armed attack qualification.
Although Charter framers also never imagined outer space as a medium
for military or commercial activity, the idea of self-defense in outer space is
uncontroversial. Since 1999, the United States has maintained that
71. Id. (warning against "the cyber threat to the networks upon which so much of [America's
way of life] depend[s]").
72. See discussion infra notes 235-259 and accompanying text.
73. See Silver, supra note 51, at 84.
74. CHRISTOPHER BOLKCOM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30639, ELECTRONIC WARFARE:
EA-6B AIRCRAFT MODERNIZATION AND RELATED ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 3-4 (2001); CHRISTOPHER
BOLKCOM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21141, MILITARY SUPPRESSION OF ENEMY AIR DEFENSES
(SEAD): ASSESSING FUTURE NEEDS 1-2 (2005) (discussing how both types of operations can involve
destructive components as well as non-destructive components that use electronic warfare capabilities to
"neutralize or disrupt" enemy capabilities).
75. Stephanie Gosnell Handler, The New Cyber Face of Battle: Developing a Legal Approach
To Accommodate Emerging Trends in Warfare, 48 STAN. J. INT'L L. 209, 221-22 (2012).
76. See Schmitt, supra note 10, at 919-20.
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"[p]urposeful interference with U.S. space systems will be viewed as an
infringement on [the] sovereign rights [of the United States]. The U.S. may
take all appropriate self-defense measures ... to respond to such an
infringement."n The use of the term "interference" suggests that non-
destructive attacks against satellites, such as dazzling and jamming, could
constitute armed attacks that trigger self-defense rights.78
Charter framers also failed to consider the possibility of private actors
mounting armed attacks against states, and it was traditionally accepted that
only states could mount armed attacks.79 After the September 11th attacks, the
Security Council adopted resolutions recognizing the right of self-defense
against al-Qaeda. The United States and its NATO allies subsequently
claimed the right to use force against the terrorists responsible for the attacks.81
Since then, several other countries have invoked self-defense against nonstate
actors, signifying that the interpretation of armed attack has evolved to
encompass nonstate actors. 82
The evolution of armed attack to include attacks in space and attacks by
nonstate actors cuts against using kinetic destruction as the determining factor
for whether an armed attack has occurred. The United States justified its right
to self-defense in response to space-based interference because "[t]he ability to
access and utilize space is ... critical to U.S. national security and economic
well-being."83  This indicates that self-defense is tied not to kinetic or
destructive effects, but rather to the right of state survival, as declared by the
77. Memorandum from William Cohen, Sec'y of Def. for Sec'ys of the Military Dep'ts et al.,
Department of Defense Space Policy, at 3 (July 9, 1999) [hereinafter Space Memorandum]; see also
DEP'T OF DEF., NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE STRATEGY: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY 10 (2011) (affirming
that the United States will "retain the right and capabilities to respond in self-defense" against attacks
that degrade its ability to operate in space).
78. Space Memorandum, supra note 77, at 3. Nowhere does the memo declare that self-
defense requires physical destruction of a U.S. space asset. Instead, the language refers to protecting the
U.S. and allies' "[a]ssured mission capability and access to space." Id. at 7; see also DEP'T OF DEF.,
REPORT OF THE COMMISSION TO ASSESS UNITED STATES NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE MANAGEMENT
AND ORGANIZATION 13-15 (2001) (making no distinction between kinetic effect-producing and non-
kinetic effect-producing threats in catalyzing a "Space Pearl Harbor"); Christopher M. Petras, The Use
of Force in Response to Cyber-Attack on Commercial Space Systems-Reexamining "Self-Defense" in
Outer Space in Light of the Convergence of U.S. Military and Commercial Space Activities, 67 J. AIR L.
& COM. 1213, 1224 (2002); J. Michael Waller, Iran, Cuba Zap U.S. Satellites, WORLDNETDAILY (Aug.
7, 2003), http://www.wnd.com/2003/08/20157.
79. Minutes of the Thirty-Sixth Meeting of the United States Delegation, Held at San
Francisco, May 11, 1945, in I FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1945, at 685-86 (1967).
The phrase "by a state" was deleted from the final version of Article 51, but did not give rise to any
discussion. Schmitt, supra note 12, at 600 ("International lawyers have traditionally, albeit not
universally, characterized Article 51 and the customary law of self-defense as applicable solely to armed
attacks mounted by one state against another.").
80. S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001); S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1368 (Sept. 11, 2011).
81. See Permanent Rep. of the U.S. to the U.N., Letter dated Oct. 7, 2001 from the Permanent
Representative of the U.S. to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council,
U.N. Doc. S/2001/946 (Oct. 7, 2001); Press Release, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Statement by
the North Atlantic Council (Sept. 12, 2001), http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/pOl-124e.htm.
82. See Raphael Van Steenberghe, Self-Defense Against Non-state Actors: Recent State
Practice, 23 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 183, 187-91, 199-200 (2010).
83. Space Memorandum, supra note 77, at 2.
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ICJ.84 Similarly, while nonstate actors have always been capable of kinetic
violence, only after the destructive attacks of September 11th did the term
"armed attack" expand to include them as permissible objects of self-defense.85
These lessons suggest that, when assessing whether a form of aggression that
did not exist at the Charter's adoption could qualify as an armed attack, rather
than searching for a kinetic-effect equivalence, it is more appropriate to
determine whether the consequences of the new mode of aggression implicate
its victims' right to survival in a manner equivalent to activities that Charter
framers unquestionably considered to be armed attacks.
The large-scale DDoS attacks of the sort waged against Estonia in 2007
produced no kinetic effects and only disrupted commerce and communications.
At the time of the U.N. Charter at least one type of aggression that neither
produced kinetic effects nor caused physical injury and/or destruction was
universally considered capable of qualifying as an armed attack: the naval
blockade. 86
IV. ANALOGIZING INTERNET DISRUPTIONS AND NAVAL BLOCKADES
Naval blockades offer a particularly useful analogy for large-scale DDoS
cyber-attacks. Like naval blockades, cyber-attacks violate a state's right to
access a common medium. Furthermore, rather than cause kinetic effects, they
disrupt commerce and communications, and their indirect effects on social
welfare are often the intended aim for which they were employed. This Part
draws parallels between blockades and Internet disruptions, and argues that the
similarities between them justify using the standard employed to determine
whether a blockade constitutes an armed attack in order to determine whether
DDoS attacks do the same. This Part ends by explicating the principles used to
determine when blockades qualify as armed attacks, how such principles can
guide jus ad bellum analysis of info-blockades, and why those principles can be
applied to the 2007 cyber-attacks against Estonia.
A. Rights of Common Access
In 1609, Grotius published the Mare Liberum in response to Portuguese
claims of jurisdiction over the high seas. Grotius argued that the sea is the
84. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226,
196 (July 8).
85. See infra notes 184-189 and accompanying text.
86. See Definition of Aggression, supra note 11, art. 3(c) (enumerating naval blockade as an
"act of aggression"); RuYs, supra note II, at 130. Although injuries and death (from lack of food or
medicine) and property damage (from lack of supplies necessary for repair or maintenance) may be
linked to blockades, such harms are causally remote and involve intervening actors, such as government
agencies that implement rationing programs. A concept of proximate causation that includes these
injuries as foreseeable effects of a blockade would also include injury and death (from inability to
contact emergency services) or property damage (from inability to make use of web-based commerce) as
foreseeable consequences of non-kinetic cyber-attacks. Such a broad scope of foresecability would
unravel the core of effects-based analysis.
87. HUGO GROTIUS, FREEDOM OF THE SEAS (James Brown Scott ed., Carnegie Endowment for
Int'l Peace 1916) (1608). In 1603, three Dutch Indian Company ships seized a Portuguese carrack. This
escalated into an international dispute implicating issues of freedom of maritime navigation and trade.
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common property of all nations, and that no nation may exclude another from
accessing the sea.88 The maritime common access principle has since become
an immutable feature of customary international law,89 and has been codified
by Article 87(1) of the 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea. 90 The
principle of common access was applied to airspace,91 and outer space,92 as
soon as those media became technologically exploitable.
Just as the common-access principle migrated from the high seas to
international airspace and outer space, it also came to govern
telecommunications media. In order to facilitate cooperative use of emerging
telecommunication technologies, the 1865 International Telegraph Convention
established the International Telegraph Union, now called the International
Telecommunications Union (ITU), which is tasked with coordinating
telecommunications and information to enable sustainable growth and improve
access.93 Over time, international consensus converged upon a principle of
common access, under which all nations are free to make use of the medium. 94
Since the establishment of the United Nations, the ITU has been
incorporated as a specialized U.N. agency responsible for information and
telecommunications technologies. 95 Today, it has 193 members and is
responsible for developing global standards and coordinating radio spectrum
allocations, satellite orbits, telecommunications networks, and Internet
access. Article 3 of the 1988 International Telecommunication Regulations
Hugo Grotius was brought in by the Dutch to provide an ideological justification for Dutch use of its
powerful navy to break up the Portuguese trade monopoly.
88. Id. at 28.
89. See MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 490 (5th ed. 2003).
90. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 87(1), Dec. 10, 1982, 21 I.L.M.
1261 (providing the right of innocent passage on the high seas).
91. The 1919 Paris Convention established that exclusive sovereign rights over airspace exists
only above each country's territory. Convention on International Civil Aviation, art. 1, Oct. 13, 1919, 11
L.N.T.S. 174 (no longer in force). The Convention drafters created no sovereign rights over international
airspace because "airspace is part of the legal regime of the subjacent territory, [and therefore] the
airspace is also free above the [high] seas." NICHOLAS GRIEF, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE
AIRSPACE OF THE HIGH SEAS 53 (1994) (citing J.C. COOPER, EXPLORATIONS IN AEROSPACE LAW 197
(1968)). This principle was reaffirmed in the 1944 Chicago Convention. Convention on International
Civil Aviation, art. 1, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180, 15 U.N.T.S. 295. State practice, including that of the
United States, affirms that the freedom of navigation over international airspace is "the same [as the
freedom of navigation in the high seas] in the sense that the nature and extent of the right is the same as
the traditional high-seas freedoms." Elliot L. Richardson, Power, Mobility and the Law of the
Sea, 58 FOREIGN AFF. 902, 916 (1980).
92. See Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies art. 1, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205.
93. JAMES G. SAVAGE, THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS
REGULATION 28-55 (1989); see also The ITU Mission: Bringing the Benefits of ICT to All the World's
Inhabitants, INT'L TELECOMM. UNION, http://www.itu.int/net/about/mission.aspx (last updated Nov. 28,
2012).
94. FRANCIS LYALL, INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS: THE INTERNATIONAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS UNION AND THE UNIVERSAL POSTAL UNION 50, 55-70 (2011) (showing that the
1906 International Radiotelegraph Convention established common access to maritime communications
infrastructure and that, in the subsequent decades, common access expanded to encompass telegraph and
radio waves generally).
95. History, INT'L TELECOMM. UNION, http://www.itu.int/en/history/overview/Pages/history.aspx
(last updated Feb. 10, 2010).
96. Id.
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(ITR) declares that, "[s]ubject to national law, any user, by having access to the
international network established by an administration [or recognized private
operating agency(ies)], has the right to send traffic."97 Some commentators
have analogized common access to telecommunications media to the mare
liberum in the information ocean, while others, including the U.N. itself,
consider Internet access as essential for human rights.99 Blocking access to
telecommunications mediums, including cyberspace, through a large-scale
DDoS attack can thus be analyzed in the same manner, for jus ad bellum
purposes, as blocking access to the sea (or to airspace or outer space). 00 In
order to engage in such analysis, it is necessary to explore the jus ad bellum
principles governing naval blockades, to uncover reasons why blockades
trigger self-defense rights, and to determine if those reasons are applicable to
DDoS.
B. Jus ad Bellum ofNaval Blockades
It is perhaps first instructive to understand the now-defunct belief holding
blockades to be incapable of constituting armed attacks, or in the pre-U.N.
Charter language, not qualifying as "acts of war." In 1827, European powers
introduced the practice of "pacific blockades" when Britain, France and Russia
blockaded a Turkish fleet in Greece while insisting on a state of peace with
Turkey.' 0 Throughout the nineteenth century, European powers with strong
navies made pacific blockades a common coercive instrument to be wielded
against weaker states without resorting to war.102 By the late 1880s, pacific
blockades had been legitimated under international law as a "hostile measures
short of war" similar to interventions.103
Just as DDoS attacks are presently not considered capable of qualifying
as armed attacks because the lack of kinetic effect bars them from constituting
"armed force," pacific blockades were not considered acts of war because the
lack of kinetic effects made them insufficiently "war-like." Albert Hogan
articulated the prevailing attitude towards pacific blockades: "it depends wholly
on the action of the blockaded state whether a blockade shall be considered as
warlike or pacific." " If the victim state resisted the blockade with force "a
97. International Telecommunication Regulations, INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION
UNION art. 3.4 (1989), http://www.itu.int/osg/csd/wtpf/wtpf2009/documents/ITUITRs_88.pdf.
98. Michael Froomkin, What the Law of the Sea Teaches Us About the Regulation of the
Information Ocean, DISCOURSE.NET (Feb. 26, 2007), http://www.discourse.net/2007/02/what-the-law
of theseateachesusaboutthe regulationoftheinformationocean.html.
99. U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and
Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/27 (May 16, 2011)
(stating that Internet access should be recognized as a human right).
100. See Lawrence Greenberg et al., Information Warfare and International Law, U.S. DEP'T
OF DEF., http://www.dodccrp.org/files/GreenbergLaw.pdf (suggesting that info-blockades may be
analogized with naval blockades).
101. ALBERT E. HOGAN, PACIFIC BLOCKADE 14 (1908).
102. See Lance Davis & Stanley Engerman, Sanctions: Neither War nor Peace, 17 J. ECON.
PERSPECTIVES 187, 188-89 (2003).
103. Ian Brownlie, The Use of Force in Self-Defense, 37 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 183, 188 (1961).
104. HOGAN, supra note 101, at 27.
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state of war [would] immediately ensue."105 Under Hogan's view, the clash of
kinetic force was required to trigger war. Though a blockade violates a nation's
right of maritime access, it is not in of itself an act of war because, unlike
armed resistance, it does not proximately cause physical injury or destruction.
Many contemporary commentators, particularly in Britain and the United
States, criticized the nineteenth century version of the kinetic effect fallacy
governing pacific blockades. Condemning a joint French-British pacific
blockade of Argentina, Lord Palmerston charged that "unless [one is] at war
with a state [one has] no right to prevent ships of other states from
communicating with the ports of that state."l 0 6 Sir John Dodson asserted that
pacific blockades effectively create states of war without formal declaration.' 07
The United States has also recognized blockades as acts of war. 08
By the early twentieth century, policy-makers and scholars began to reject
the notion that pacific blockades do not trigger war. The British halted German
attempts to impose a pacific blockade against Venezuela in 1902, and forced
Berlin to first recognize that a state of war existed between itself and Caracas
before imposing the blockade.109 No nation has attempted to impose a pacific
blockade since that time. 1o John Westlake criticized pacific blockades and
legitimized self-defense against them. "[A]ny blockade established in time of
peace are Pacific Blockades [only] in the etymological sense of the words,"
wrote Westlake. "[N]o state can be prevented from declaring war [in
response].""' The post-World War I desire to place blame on starting wars led
to the doctrine of retroactivity to govern pacific blockades and other "measures
short of war." Under this doctrine "[i]f the [victim] State elects in favo[r] of
war [in response to a blockade], its election has a retroactive effect, and the
state of war arises on the commission of the first act of force by the [blockading
state]."ll2 By mid-century, pacific blockades were widely held to be 'acts of
war intended to bring your adversary to your way of thinking or to his
knees."""
105. Id. at 28.
106. Clive Parry, British Practice in Some Nineteenth Century Pacific Blockades, 8
HEIDELBERG J. INT'L L. 672, 678 (1938).
107. Id. at 685.
108. See, e.g., Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 636 (1862) (stating that a blockade can only
be imposed if an actual state of war exists).
109. Christopher R. Rossi, Jus ad Bellum in the Shadow of the Twentieth Century, 15 N.Y.L.
SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 49 (1994).
110. However, some have tried to do so through other names, such as "quarantine." See, e.g.,
ABRAM CHAYES, THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS: INTERNATIONAL CRISES AND THE ROLE OF LAW 14-15
(1974).
111. John Westlake, Pacific Blockade, 1909, in THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF JOHN WESTLAKE
ON PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 572, 572 (L. Oppenheim ed., 1914).
112. Arnold D. McNair, The Legal Meaning of War, and the Relation of War to Reprisals, 11
TRANSACTIONS GROTIUS SOC'Y 29, 39 (1925).
113. FRANcIS D. WoRMuTH & EDWIN B. FIRMAGE, To CHAIN THE DOG OF WAR: THE WAR
POWER OF CONGRESS IN HISTORY AND LAW 44 (2d ed. 1989) (quoting President Eisenhower's
statements regarding the impropriety of imposing a blockade to coerce China into handing over
imprisoned U.S. citizens).
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The term "act of war" lost legal meaning after the drafting of the United
Nations Charter. Article 42 of the Charter lists blockade as a measure that
requires Security Council authorization. Without such authorization, blockades
are aggressive and illegal uses of force, which can be classified as armed
attacks if imposed with sufficient scale and effect.' 14 The Arab-Israeli conflict
over the Straits of Tiran provides useful insight into reasons why a blockade,
despite lacking kinetic effect, can qualify as an armed attack, and reveal
conditions under which it does so qualify.
1. The Strait of Tiran
Israel invaded Egypt in the 1956 Suez Crisis, in part, in response to the
Egyptian blockade of the Strait of Tiran, which cut off Israel's access to the
Red Sea and Indian Ocean." 5 As Israel withdrew from Egyptian territory in
1957, foreign minister Golda Meir declared to the U.N. General Assembly that
Interference, by armed force, with ships of Israeli flag exercising free and innocent
passage in the Gulf of Aqaba and through the Straits of Tiran will be regarded by
Israel as an attack entitling it to exercise its inherent right of self-defence under
Article 51 of the Charter and to take all such measures as are necessary to ensure
the free and innocent passage of its ships in the Gulf and in the Straits.
The international community accepted this position," 7 and the United
Nations deployed a peacekeeping force to prevent interference to freedom of
navigation in the Straits of Tiran. In May 1967, Egypt ejected peacekeepers
and once again blockaded the Straits of Tiran.119 In early June, the Israel
Defense Force struck Egypt.120 In addition to justifying the use of military
force under the controversial theory of anticipatory self-defense, Israel held that
the blockade of the Straits of Tiran constituted an armed attack, which allowed
it to invoke its Article 51 rights.'21
Many disputed the assertion that the blockade met the armed attack
threshold. T.D. Gill argues that the blockade did not rise to the level of an
armed attack because "Israel's air and sea communications through the
Mediterranean were still unaffected, and Israel was neither facing strangulation
114. See Definition of Aggression, supra note 11, art. 3(c); Jane Gilliland, Note, Submarines
and Targets: Suggestions for New Codified Rules of Submarine Warfare, 73 GEO. L.J. 975, 992 n.121
(1985).
115. DAVID TAL, THE 1956 WAR: COLLUSION AND RIVALRY IN THE MIDDLE EAST 31(2001).
116. U.N. GAOR, IIth Sess., 666th plen. mtg. at 1275-76, U.N. Doc. A/PV.666 (Mar. 1, 1957).
117. See Jonathan E. Fink, The Gulf of Aqaba and the Strait of Tiran: The Practice of
"Freedom ofNavigation" After the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty, 42 NAV. L. REV. 121, 127-28 (1995).
118. Id. at 123.
119. DONALD NEFF, WARRIORS FOR JERUSALEM: THE Six DAYS THAT CHANGED THE MIDDLE
EAST 89 (1984).
120. Id. at 203.
121. Speaking to the General Assembly, the Israeli Foreign Minister declared, "The blockade
[of the Straits of Tiran] is by definition an act of war . ... From the moment the blockade was imposed,
active hostilities had commenced and Israel owed Egypt nothing of her Charter rights." U.N. GAOR, 5th
Emer. Sess., 1526th mtg. 1133, U.N. Doc. A/PV.1526 (June 19, 1967).
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nor economic ruin."1 22 Defenders of Israeli action point out that over eighty
percent of Israel's oil supply arrived through the Red Sea, and that restricting
such a strategic resource was tantamount to strangulation.1 23
For our purposes, it is unimportant whether or not the blockade of the
Strait of Tiran in 1967 actually qualified as an armed attack. The important part
is that all parties agreed that blockades can be an armed attack, and that the
debate over whether Egypt's specific actions constituted an armed attack
hinged on whether the blockade threatened Israel with "strangulation or
economic ruin." Even opponents concede that, if the Egyptian blockade had
more seriously jeopardized commerce and communications, for example by
cutting off all traffic, it would have been an armed attack justifying self-
defense.124
The reliance on the threat of "strangulation or economic ruin" to justify
classifying blockades as armed attacks is congruent with the notion that self-
defense is an extension of the right to survival. Whether a blockade actually
threatens such damage is predicated upon the scale and effect of its imposition,
consistent with the principle announced by the Nicaragua court. 125
C. Applying the Standard to DDoS Attacks
Blocking the right of common access to the sea can constitute an armed
attack if it seriously disrupts commerce and communications so as to threaten
victims with strangulation or economic ruin. A key jus ad bellum question is
whether blocking common access to the Internet can cause commensurate
levels of harm.
An important distinction between naval blockade and cyber-blockades is
that the former restricts the flow of physical goods, while the latter merely
affects the flow of information. While it may have been true in the past that
information blockades do not threaten the welfare of a state or its inhabitants as
much as physical blockades, this is no longer the case in modem societies, in
which individuals are heavily dependent upon access to digital information for
their physical and material well-being.126
The distinction between physical and nonphysical goods and assets has
also begun to break down. Individuals value nonphysical property, and
122. Terry D. Gill, The Temporal Dimension of Self-Defense: Anticipation, Pre-emption,
Prevention and Immediacy, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARMED CONFLICT: EXPLORING THE
FAULTLINES 113, 138-39 (Michael N. Schmitt & Jelena Pejic eds., 2007).
123. See, e.g., Edward Miller, Self-Defense, International Law and the Six Day War, 20 ISR. L.
REv. 49, 64 (1985).
124. Gill, supra note 122, at 138 (denying that the blockade was an armed attack but noting that
"[i]f Egypt had attempted to cut Israel's sea and air communications completely, the situation would
have been different").
125. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J.
14, 1195 (June 22).
126. See CABINET OFFICE, CYBER SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED KINGDOM: SAFETY,
SECURITY AND RESILIENCE IN CYBER SPACE 12 (2009) [hereinafter UK CYBER SECURITY REPORT]
(recognizing that growing dependence on cyberspace by the government, businesses and individuals in
the United Kingdom has led to increased vulnerability to disruption of information infrastructure).
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governments have responded by providing virtual property protection.127
Meanwhile, governments and businesses rely upon digital infrastructure as
much as physical machines to provide goods and services. DDoS attacks
against websites can affect the profitability of businesses, or the capability of
governments to function effectively, as negatively as a physical blockade. The
notion that an information disruption may meet the armed-attack threshold is
nothing new; recall that the Pentagon already considers interference with access
to outer space-a medium that is nearly exclusively a conduit of electronic
information-as capable of constituting armed attack because of the United
States's dependence on space.128 Because individuals, businesses, and
governments in modern societies depend on the Internet as they do on access to
space or the sea,129 there is no reason why large-scale Internet denial cannot
cause the same level of disruption, thereby qualifying as an armed attack.
In addition to the scale of the blockading force, the vulnerability of the
victim state to the effects of a blockade is a key factor in analyzing whether a
blockade constitutes an armed attack. For example, a flotilla that blockades a
minor port of a large country may fail to meet the armed-attack standard
because commercial and strategic goods continue to flow into the victim
country through other ports or land borders, or because the country is self-
sufficient in key resources. Conversely, if the same flotilla were used against a
small island country that lacks alternative transportation options or natural
resources, the effect would be more likely to meet the gravity requirement for
an armed attack. The scale of the blockade is not the only key factor to
adjudicate whether it is an armed attack; it must be contextualized by the
degree to which the target relies upon access to the sea.
The above principle should guide our analysis of a denial-of-service
attack. If Internet denial causes neither injury nor destruction, but is of
sufficient scale and effect to threaten the target state with strangulation or
economic ruin, it constitutes an armed attack. When undertaking this analysis,
one must consider not only the scale and sophistication of the cyber-attack, but
also the vulnerability of the target state, which would include consideration of
its size and the degree to which it relies upon cyberspace access for commerce,
communications, and other functions. The smaller the state, the greater the
reliance on cyberspace, and the less intense the cyber-attacks need to be in
order to meet the ICJ's gravity standard and constitute armed attacks.
Though the ICJ has offered a gravity standard, it has not explained what
precisely constitutes a "most grave" use of force. To develop a better
understanding to apply to DDoS cyber-attacks, it is illuminating to examine the
impact of historical blockades that unquestionably met the armed attack
127. See A Model Economy, ECONOMIsT, Jan. 20, 2005, http://www.economist.com/node/3577988.
States have begun to codify rules governing virtual property; see, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 58 § 269
(West 2012) (giving executors control over virtual property).
128. Space Memorandum, supra note 77, at 3.
129. See UK CYBER SECURITY REPORT, supra note 126, at 12 (identifying cyberspace, along
with land, sea, and outer space, as a domain in which disruptions can cause critical national security
implications due to heavy reliance).
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threshold. These include the British blockades of France and the United States
during the French and American Revolutions, the North's blockade of the
South during the Civil War, the British blockade of Germany during World
War I, and the U.N.-authorized blockade of Iraq from 1991-2003.
Wars of the French Revolution: In an effort to measure the economic
effect of the wars resulting from the French revolutions and the War of 1812,
Kevin O'Rourke estimated that the wartime blockades reduced French and U.S.
trade volume by over fifty percent.130 The combined effects of blockades,
embargoes, and other wartime trade restrictions reduced welfare in France by
three to four percent per year and in the United States by five to six percent per
year. 131
American Civil War: Military historians recognize the Anaconda Plan-
the blockade of the Confederacy during the Civil War-as a critical element in
the North's victory, as it deprived the South of valuable financial and material
resources. 132 The effect on cotton exports alone was devastating and is
estimated to have deprived the South of $1 billion in revenue, which is nearly
equivalent to the $1.1 billion the Confederacy spent on its military. 33
World War I: During the First World War, the British blockaded German
ports. By 1915, German imports and exports had fallen to half of pre-war
levels. 134 Additionally, Germany suffered from severe shortages in food;
estimates place average daily caloric intake to have fallen to one thousand per
day by 1917.135 Hundreds of thousands of German citizens may have died from
starvation or disease due to the blockade.' 36
Iraq Blockade: The United Nations authorized a blockade of Iraq in 1990
that lasted until 2003.137 The decade-long blockade reduced per capita income
from a pre-war level of over $3,000 to less than $500. 138 In addition to
economic effects, the blockades contributed to starvation and the devastation of
Iraqi sanitation, education and public health sectors, leading to decline in
literacy, and increases in diseases and infant mortality rates.139
130. Kevin H. O'Rourke, The Worldwide Economic Impact of the French Revolutionary and
Napoleonic Wars, 1793-1815, 1 J. GLOBAL HIST. 123, 129 (2006).
131. Id. at 146. In Britain, which had the most powerful navy and tended to be a blockading
rather than blockaded state, welfare fell by less than two percent per year. Id.
132. Paul D. Hugill, The Continuing Utility of Naval Blockades in the Twenty-First Century
24-27 (June 5, 1998) (unpublished master's thesis, U.S. Army Command.) (on file with the U.S. Naval
Acad. Library).
133. Id. at 25.
134. The Blockade of Germany, NAT'L ARCHIVES, http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/pathways
/firstworldwar/spotlights/blockade.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2012).
135. Id.
136. Id. (estimating a death toll of 763,000); see also LEO GREBLER & WILHELM WINKLER,
THE COST OF THE WORLD WAR TO GERMANY AND TO AUSTRIA-HUNGARY 78 (1940) (putting the toll at
424,000).
137. S.C. Res. 665, U.N. Doc. S/RES/665 (Aug. 25, 1990) (calling upon member states "which
are deploying maritime forces to the [Persian Gulf] to use such measures commensurate to the specific
circumstances as may be necessary ... to halt all inward and outward maritime shipping").
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These facts suggest that, in terms of general commercial disruption, a
naval blockade that suppresses economic output by at least three-to-five percent
rises to the level of armed attack. Further, blockades crippling critical
infrastructure, such as the agricultural or public health sectors, may also qualify
as armed attacks. DDoS attacks causing comparable harm may therefore meet
the threshold for armed attack. Naval or cyberspace blockades need not have
actually caused the aforementioned level of damage in order to qualify as
armed attacks; they merely need to foreseeably cause the requisite negative
impact, if allowed to continue unabated.
D. Applying Standards to the 2007 Attack on Estonia
We can apply these standards on the 2007 DDoS cyber-campaign against
Estonia. After presenting an overview of the 2007 attacks, this Section relies
upon the metrics developed above to argue that they constituted an armed
attack against Estonia.
1. Overview of the Attack
Estonia removed a Soviet war memorial from Tallinn in 2007 because it
viewed the memorial as a symbol of foreign occupation.14 0 Russians felt that
the action was an affront to the sacrifices made during their struggle against
Nazi aggression; pro-Kremlin youth groups protested by surrounding the
Estonian embassy, shutting it down for several weeks. After mediation from
Western nations, Russian authorities intervened to reopen the embassy. 141
Sporadic cyber-attacks began targeting Estonian government websites on April
27th and expanded dramatically in scope and intensity on May 2nd.142 Attacks
came in the form of large-scale deliveries of electronic packets sent from bots
that overwhelmed servers' processing capacities.143 Banks, news agencies,
telecom companies, and government ministries suffered loss of Internet access
over the next two weeks.144 Perhaps more worryingly, the attacks compromised
mission-critical systems, including those used for telephone exchanges.
Estonians were left unable to call for emergency services. 14 5
Estonia's government suspected that the attacks came from Russia and
requested assistance from Moscow on May 10th under the 1993 Estonia-Russia
Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty.146 However, the Russian government refused
140. A Cyber-Riot, ECONOMIST, May 10, 2007, http://www.economist.com/node/9163598.
141. Id.
142. Davis, supra note 2.
143. Newly Nasty, ECONOMIST, May 24, 2007, http://www.economist.com/node/9228757.
144. Id.
145. Jeffrey Kelsey, Hacking into International Humanitarian Law: The Principles of
Distinction and Neutrality in the Age of Cyber Warfare, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1427, 1429 (2008).
146. See Agreement on Mutual Legal Assistance and Legal Relations in Civil, Family, and
Criminal Matters, Est.-Russ., art. 3, Jan. 26 1993, 11 1993 Riigi Teataja (State Gaz.) 16, 27 [hereinafter
Legal Assistance Treaty] (obligating mutual assistance in a non-exhaustive list of procedural activities
including criminal prosecution, investigation, and extradition).
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to help identify or stop responsible groups. 147 Although impromptu
countermeasures prevented a complete digital collapse, these efforts also
severed Estonia's Internet connection with the rest of the world.148 In mid-
May, fortunately, these attacks suddenly ended. 149
2. Was This an Armed Attack?
Under the effects-based approach, cyber-attacks-with consequences
broadly equivalent to an operation committed with conventional forces-may
be considered armed attacks in the context of Article 51.150 When evaluating
the seriousness of maritime blockades, for example, the quantity of force used
to impose the blockade is measured, along with the size of the victim state and
the degree to which the state relies upon maritime access for commerce,
communication, and other critical infrastructure functions. Similarly, the size of
a state and its reliance on cyberspace access are key considerations when
evaluating the seriousness of Internet blockades.
In Estonia's case, we have a tiny country that relies greatly on the
Internet.'5 1 At the time of the attack, Estonia's citizens enjoyed WiFi coverage
in 95% of the country; 99% of them used the Internet for banking and 86%
completed their taxes online.152 The Internet has also become a key component
of Estonia's democratic process. A month prior to the cyber-attacks, Estonia
held the world's first web-based national election, in which 5.5% of votes were
cast online. In its most recent election in 2011, nearly a quarter of votes were
cast online. 153 Few countries in the world rely upon the Internet as heavily as
Estonia does for commerce, communication, and other services. This reliance
and the small size of the country (1.3 million in 2007) make Estonia arguably
the most vulnerable country in the world to DDoS attacks-an Internet attack
that would be a mere nuisance in other countries could cause devastating
consequences in the small state.
The economic loss attributable to the attack is estimated to be heavy. The
cost to Hansabank alone was 10 million euros. 154 The overall negative
economic effect is estimated at between 27.5 and 40.5 million dollars.1 55
147. Jody R. Westby, The Path to Cyber Stability, in Jody R. Wesby et al., Rights and
Responsibilities in Cyberspace: Balancing the Need for Security and Liberty, E.N. INST. & WORLD
FED'N OF SCIENCES 1, 1-2 (2010).
148. Davis, supra note 2.
149. Id.
150. Graham, supra note 50, at 91.
151. Davis, supra note 2.
152. Merike Kaeo, Founder & Chief Network Security Architect, Double Shot Security,
Presentation on Cyber Attacks on Estonia (2007), http://www.doubleshotsecurity.com/pdf/NANOG-eesti.pdf.
153. Statistics About Internet Voting in Estonia, VABARIIGI VALIMISKOMISJON, http://www.vvk
.ee/voting-methods-in-estonia/engindex/statistics (last visited Oct. 20, 2012).
154. Toomas Hbemigi, Price of Cyberattacks to Hansabank: 10 Million Euros, BALTIC BUS.
NEWS, Aug. 12, 2010, http://balticbusinessnews.com/article/2010/12/08/Price-of-cyberttacks-to-Hansabank
-10-million-euros.
155. EU Seeks Unfied Cybersecurity Regime, UNITED PRESS INT'L, June 16, 2011, http://www.upi
.com/TopNews/Special/2011/06/16/EU-seeks-unified-cybersecurity-regime/UPI-87891308219420
(estimating economic damage at between $27.5 million and $40.5 million, using converted euro rates).
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Although that was small in comparison to Estonia's approximately 15.55
billion euro GDPI5 6 at the time, it accounted for approximately 3.5% to 5.2%
of Estonia's overall economic activity during the relevant period.' 57 Relying
upon the "rate of economic loss" metric, the effect of the attacks on commercial
activity was comparable to the effect of historical blockades imposed during
armed conflicts of high intensity.
Furthermore, the cyber-attacks compromised critical infrastructure.
Absent heroic mitigation efforts, it was quite possible that Estonia's financial
and telecommunication infrastructure would have collapsed, which would have
degraded Tallinn's ability to carry out anything other than its core state
functions, including education, public safety, and public health. 58 The effects-
based approach focuses on the foreseeable consequences of a cyber-attack to
determine whether it rises to the level of an armed attack.159 Given that disaster
was averted only through heroic efforts, the collapse of Estonia's financial and
telecom infrastructure can still be considered a foreseeable consequence of the
2007 attacks. It would be outlandishly absurd if jus ad bellum analysis
permitted mitigation to reduce the seriousness of an aggressive use of force.' 60
As a hypothetical example, the successful interception of a North Korean
ICBM targeting Los Angeles by missile defense systems would not demote the
act from an armed attack to merely a "less grave" use of force.
V. SELF-DEFENSE UNDER CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
When exercising self-defense against an Internet disruption that rises to
the level of armed attack, a state must follow the principles of necessity and
proportionality under customary international law.' 6 ' The principle of necessity
requires that force may be used only as a last resort, when peaceful means, such
as a diplomatic settlement, cannot remove the threat.16 2 Proportionality extends
156. Dublin Chamber of Commerce, Factsheet on Estonia, ENTERPRISE EUROPE NETWORK
(2008), http://www.een-ireland.ie/eei/assets/documents/uploaded/general/EstoniaF.pdf
157. Estonia's average daily GDP is approximately 42.5 million euro. The attacks averaged
causing between 1.5 million and 2.2 million euro of loss between May 3rd and May 17th. (Estonia's
average daily GDP can be calculated by dividing 15.55 billion euro annual GDP id, by 365. The
attacked caused between 21 and 31 million euro equivalent of economic loss, supra note 155, over a 14-
day period, which is equivalent to 1.5 to 2.2 million euro per day.)
158. Davis, supra note 2 ("'The attacks were aimed at the essential electronic infrastructure of
the Republic of Estonia . ... All major commercial banks, telcos, media outlets, and name servers-the
phone books of the Internet-felt the impact, and this affected the majority of the Estonian population.
This was the first time that a botnet threatened the national security of an entire nation."' (quoting
Estonian Defense Minister Jaak Aaviksoo)).
159. See Hathaway et al., supra note 10, at 848.
160. It may, however, mean that self-defense is no longer "necessary" under customary
international law. See infra notes 204-206 and accompanying text.
161. See Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 168, % 76-77 (Nov. 6); Military and
Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 1.C.J. 14, 1 176 (June 27);
DINSTEIN, supra note 24, at 237.
162. As U.S. Secretary of State Daniel Webster wrote to his British counterpart concerning the
Caroline incident, "It must be shown that admonition or remonstrance to the persons on board the
Caroline was impracticable, or would have been unavailing ... but that there was a necessity, present
and inevitable, for attacking her." Letter from Daniel Webster, U.S. Sec'y of State, to Lord Ashburton
(July 27, 1842) (quoted in Jennings, supra note 17, at 89).
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this logic, prohibiting the use of force in excess of that which is needed for self-
defense.163 The United States has acknowledged that these principles apply to
military responses to cyber-attacks. 16 However, attribution to the responsible
party in cyber attacks may prove difficult. This Section analyzes how the
attribution, necessity, and proportionality requirements operate, and considers
how they could have shaped the scope of Estonia's self-defense measures
against the 2007 DDoS attacks.
A. Attribution Requirement in Self-Defense
In order for a response to be a necessary and proportional self-defense
measure, it must at least be directed against the responsible actor. Attributing
responsibility proves especially difficult for cyber-attacks. 165
The first requirement for attribution is tracing a cyber-attack to its origin.
This task may be quite challenging because the Internet was not designed to
facilitate tracking, and sophisticated actors are becoming adept at covering their
tracks.166 Though daunting, the tracing problem is in fact not impossible and is
somewhat diminished in the context of a large-scale DDoS attack; the large
volume of traffic involved allows probabilistic tracing techniques to be
particularly effective.167 Though DDoS attackers may attempt to hide their
identity through "zombie" computers and "bots," patient cyber-security experts
who wait for infected computers to request instruction from "masters" can
follow IP packets back to controlling terminals. 68
Using trace-back techniques, Estonian officials claimed to have identified
the computers controlling the cyber-attack, and asserted that the attacks were
163. See Robert D. Sloane, The Cost of Conflation: Preserving the Dualism of Jus ad Bellum
and Jus in Bello in the Contemporary Law of War, 34 YALE J. INT'L L. 47, 108-09 (2009) ("Ad bellum
proportionality is ... parasitic on ad bellum necessity .... An act is ad bellum disproportionate if the
same ad bellum objective sought by force clearly could have been achieved by diplomacy or another
nonviolent strategy at a roughly comparable, or even moderately greater, cost.").
164. See OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY FOR CYBERSPACE:
PROSPERITY, SECURITY, AND OPENNESS IN A NETWORKED WORLD 14 (2011) ("[W]e will exhaust all
options before military force whenever we can; will carefully weigh the costs and risks of action against
the costs of inaction; and will act in a way that reflects our values and strengthens our legitimacy,
seeking broad international support whenever possible.").
165. Id; see DAVID WHEELER & GREGORY LARSEN, TECHNIQUES FOR CYBER ATTACK
ATTRIBUTION (2003) ("In particular, attackers can cause attacks to be delayed and perform their attacks
through many intermediaries in many jurisdictions, making attribution difficult.").
166. JEFFRiY HUNKER ET AL., ROLE AND CHALLENGES FOR SUFFICIENT CYBER-ATTACK
ATTRIBUTION 5-6 (2008); Larry Greenemeier, Seeking Address: Why Cyber Attacks Are So Difficult to
Trace Back to Hackers, SCI. AM., June 11, 2011, http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id
=tracking-cyber-hackers.
167. HOWARD F. LIPSON, TRACKING AND TRACING CYBER-ATTACKS: TECHNICAL
CHALLENGES AND GLOBAL POLICY ISSUES 28-42 (2002) (detailing probabilistic tracing techniques).
168. RICHARD A. CLARKE & ROBERT K. KNAKE, CYBER WAR: THE NEXT THREAT TO
NATIONAL SECURITY AND WHAT To DO ABOUT IT 15 (2010). The evidentiary requirement for self-
defense based on a trace should be "clear and compelling." Schmitt, supra note 12, at 594-96; see Mary
Ellen O'Connell, Rules of Evidence for the Use of Force in International Law's New Era, 100 AM.
SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 44, 46-47 (2006) (showing that appeals to "clear," "compelling," or "convincing"
evidence preceded uses of force in the 1986 Libya bombing, the 1993 Baghdad bombing, the 1998
missile strikes against Sudan, and post-9/11 self-defense against the Taliban in 2001).
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originating from I.P. addresses belonging to the Russian government.169 Given
that probabilistic tracing is especially effective against DDoS attacks, we can
be confident that the trackers were accurate. This confidence is bolstered by the
ex post revelation that Nashi, the Kremlin-backed paramilitary youth-group
Estonia initially alleged to have orchestrated the attacks, ultimately claimed
responsibility.170 According to one account, even if "it remains unclear whether
the Russian government officially sanctioned the strike, it is undisputed that
Russians were responsible."17 '
Lawful self-defense against a state which originates armed cyber-attachs
requires that the state be both confidently identifiable as the regional source of
the attacks, as well as actually responsible for the attacks.' 72 International law
treats states as responsible for the conduct of an individual acting "on behalf of
the State, having been charged by some competent organ" 1 or "on the
instructions of, or under the direction or control of, that State." l74 Self-defense
against a state is permissible when armed cyber-attacks are perpetrated by
government organs, such as the armed forces or intelligence services. In 2007,
Estonia was unable to demonstrate whether the responsible groups were direct
agents of Moscow, but nonetheless claimed to have circumstantial evidence
linking Moscow to the attacks.' 75 Estonian officials claimed that the scale and
sophistication of the attacks required such significant financial and technical
resources to suggest government support. Indeed, it has been reported that the
Kremlin funds Nashi activities.
International courts have relied upon two competing standards of control
to determine state responsibility for the actions of nonstate actors. The
"effective control" standard was initially articulated in the Nicaragua case and
requires that nonstate actors act in total dependence before their actions can be
attributable to the state.177 The broader "overall control" standard was born out
of the Tadi6 case at the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY)
and provides that equipping, financing, and training, along with limited
169. See CLARKE & KNAKE, supra note 168, at 15; Nate Anderson, Massive DDoS Attacks
Target Estonia: Russia Accused, ARS TECHNICA, May 14, 2007, http://www.arstechnica.com/security
/2007/05/massive-ddos-attacks-target-estonia-russia-accused.
170. Charles Clover, Kremlin-Backed Group Behind Estonia Cyber Blitz, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 11,
2009, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/57536d5a-Oddc-I lde-8ea3-0000779fd2ac.html.
171. Gadi Evron, Battling Botnets and Online Mobs: Estonia's Defense Efforts During the
Internet War, 9 GEO. J. INT'L AFF. 121, 123 (2008).
172. Levi Grosswald, Note, Cyberattack Attribution Matters Under Article 51 of the U.N.
Charter, 35 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1151, 1155-56 (2011).
173. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3, 1 58
(May 24).
174. Draft Articles, supra note 8, art. VIII.
175. Gregg Keizer, Estonia Blamed Russia for Backing 2007 Cyberattacks, Says Leaked Cable,
COMPUTERWORLD (Dec. 9, 2010), http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9200600/Estonia-blamed
_Russia for backing_2007_cyberattacks saysleaked cable.
176. Cathy Young, Op-Ed., Putin's Young "Brownshirts," Bos. GLOBE, Aug. 10, 2007,
http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorialopinion/oped/articles/ 2 0 0 7 /08/10/Putins young brownshirts.
177. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J.
1 105-15 (June 27) (declaring that assistance in financing, training, and equipping, and planning is
insufficient to attribute responsibility of contra activities to the United States unless it can be shown that
the United States had "effective control" of the paramilitary operation).
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supervision, could make the state responsible for acts of the organization.178
Because of the high evidentiary burden required to demonstrate effective
control, which may be impossible in cyberspace, some scholars have held up
the overall control test as a superior standard.17 9 Recent state practice and the
Security Council also seem to favor the overall control test.180
An overall control test would attribute responsibility if it could be shown
that Moscow provided not only material support, but also instruction and
guidance, though it need not have had complete control.' 8 Recent evidence has
emerged that Nashi does in fact act under instruction of Pro-Putin elements of
the Russian government. 182 A recent of cache of emails between the Russian
Federal Youth Agency and Nashi unveiled government-guided Nashi activities
seeking to discredit the opposition.'8 We do not know the specific content of
Estonia's claim to circumstantial evidence, but if it included this sort of
connection, it may be sufficient to permit self-defense against the Russian state
under an overall control test. However, because Nashi is not completely
subservient to Russia, an effective control test would not have assigned
responsibility to, or permitted self-defense against, Moscow.
Even if victims of armed attacks cannot connect attacks to a state, self-
defense may be permissible against responsible nonstate actors. For most of the
twentieth century, the dominant belief held that only states are capable of
launching armed attacks and being the targets of self-defense under Article
51.184 However, in recognition of the danger that nonstate actors pose in the
twenty-first century in the aftermath of the September 11th terrorist attacks, the
Security Council issued resolutions recognizing that nonstate actors can
perpetrate armed attacks, and that the right of self-defense can be invoked
against those actors.185
The ICJ has pushed back against this development; in its 2004 advisory
opinion on the legality of the Israeli security wall, the Court declared that
Article 51 recognizes only "the existence of an inherent right of self-defense in
178. Marco Sassbli & Laura M. Olson, Prosecutor v. Tadid, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 571, 572 (2000).
179. Scott J. Shackelford & Richard B. Andres, State Responsibility for Cyber Attacks:
Competing Standards for a Growing Problem, 42 GEO. J. INT'L L. 971, 987-88 (2011).
180. See, e.g., Permanent Rep. of the U.S. to the U.N., supra note 81 (claiming that the United
States was exercising self-defense against the Taliban, because there was "clear and compelling
evidence" that the Taliban was involved in the September 11th attacks, and claiming that the United
Nations did not object to this evidence); Ren6 Vark, State Responsibility for Private Armed Groups in
the Context of Terrorism, 11 JURIDICA INT'L 184, 189 (2006) (concluding that while the Taliban did not
exercise effective control over al Qaeda, it did exercise overall control).
181. Shackelford & Andres, supra note 179, at 987-89.
182. Miriam Elder, Polishing Putin: Hacked Emails Suggest Dirty Tricks by Russian Youth
Group, GUARDIAN (London), Feb. 7, 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/feb/07/putin-hacked
-emails-russian-nashi; Hackers and the Kremlin: Nashi Exposed, ECONOMIST: EASTERN APPROACHES
(Feb. 9,2012,3:45 PM), http://www.economist.com/blogs/eastemapproaches/2012/02/hackers-and-kremlin.
183. Id.
184. Definition of Aggression, supra note 11, Annex art. I & 2 (specifying that aggression is
only defined as the use of armed force by a state against another state).
185. S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001); S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1368 (Sept. 11, 2011).
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the case of armed attacks by one state against another state."1 86 The ICJ seems
to have reaffirmed this position in the Armed Activities decision.' However
these decisions have been criticized for ignoring the fact that Article 51 of the
U.N. Charter contains no textual reference to state actors and for contradicting
the position of the Security Council. 88 In matters of international peace and
security, it is generally held that the Security Council holds primacy over the
IcJ. 189
In order to balance the right of self-defense of the victim state against the
sovereignty of the host state, international scholars have advanced an
"unwilling or unable" test, whereby violating the host state's sovereignty in
self-defense is permissible only if the host is unable or unwilling to prevent
armed attacks launched from its territory.190 This is an extension of the
necessity principle: if the host state were willing and able to deal with the threat
through domestic law enforcement, self-defense would be unnecessary.' 9' In
2006, Israel invaded Lebanon in response to Hezbollah rocket attacks. Israel
initially attempted to attribute Hezbollah's actions to Lebanon, and justified its
actions as self-defense against a state actor.192 It soon became apparent that
there was insufficient basis to attribute Hezbollah's activities to Lebanon, and
Israel's self-defense justification focused on Hezbollah instead.' 9 3 Because
Lebanon proved "unable or unwilling" to control Hezbollah, many accept that
Israel had a right of self-defense against Hezbollah.194
Under such a doctrine, even if Estonia could not lawfully defend itself
against the Russian state, it could use force against responsible nonstate actors
if Russia proved "unwilling or unable" to take action. Once Tallinn traced I.P.
addresses back to Russia, it requested Moscow's assistance in the task of
tracking down responsible parties in order to halt the attack. However, the
186. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136,1 139 (July 9) (emphasis added).
187. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 2005 I.C.J.
168, 1 147 (Dec. 19) (rejecting Uganda's justification of self-defense against rebel troops operating in
the Democratic Republic of Congo); Stephanie A. Barbour & Zoe A. Salzman, "The Tangled Web":
The Right of Self-Defense Against Non-State Actors in the Armed Activities Case, 40 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L.
& POL. 53, 61-62 (2008) (interpreting the decision to say "that attacks carried out by non-State actors
that are not attributable to a State are not armed attacks within the scope of article 51, and therefore do
not entitle the victim State to respond with force in self-defense").
188. Legal Consequences of Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 2004
I.C.J. 240, 16 (July 9) (Buergenthal, J., dissenting); Schmitt, supra note 12, at 601.
189. Kathleen Rende Cronin-Furman, The International Court of Justice and the United
Nations Security Council: Rethinking a Complicated Relationship, 106 COLuM. L. REv. 435, 462-63
(2006).
190. Elizabeth Wilmshurst, The Chatham House Principles of International Law on the Use of
Force in Self-Defence, 55 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 963,969 (2006).
191. Ashley S. Deeks, "Unwilling or Unable": Toward a Normative Framework for
Extraterritorial Self-Defense, 52 VA. J. INT'L L. 483, 495 (2012).
192. Michael N. Schmitt, "Change Direction" 2006: Israeli Operations in Lebanon and the
International Law of Self-Defense, 29 MICH. J. INT'L L. 127, 136 (2008).
193. Id. at 144-45.
194. Id. at 148-49.
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Russian government refused to help.195 This could potentially be adequate
evidence of Russian "unwillingness."
B. Necessity in Self-Defense
The principle of necessity dictates that legitimate self-defense is
permissible only when a state exhausts alternatives to the use of force. 196 One
alternative that a state must seek out is diplomacy, including both efforts to
convince the offending state to halt an attack and to appeal to international
actors to resolve the dispute. This requirement is by no means unlimited.'97 A
victimized state need not acquiesce to the coercive demands of an aggressor,
nor must it continuously seek diplomatic solution if attempts are met with
futility. In addition to seeking diplomatic solutions, states suffering cyber-
attacks must also attempt to mitigate damages via passive defenses and other
non-forceful alternatives before resorting to self-defense. 98
Most analyses of exhaustion of alternatives focus on the claim of
anticipatory self-defense, whereby the threatened nation must make all
available efforts until the danger is imminent. 99 As a result, satisfaction of this
requirement has depended less on the vigor with which a state pursues
alternatives and more on the immediacy of the threat. 200
DDoS attacks differ from conventional armed attacks in that, while their
imposition is immediate, their effects are not. Once again, the analogy with a
naval blockade is particularly instructive, as it may take a blockade a great deal
of time before it threatens the survival of the victim state.2 0 1 A state could
therefore not lawfully exercise self-defense at the onset of a blockade, and
would instead have to devote time and effort to pursuing alternatives. On the
other hand, a state need not wait until it actually faces economic ruin or
strangulation before resorting to self-defense. The necessity principle instead
requires that, prior to invoking armed self-defense against a blockade, a state
must evaluate the likelihood that diplomacy or non-forceful alternatives can end
the blockade before suffering levels of harm that are consistent with an armed
attack. Wide availability of promising alternatives would make resort to force
less necessary, thus obliging the state to devote greater time and energy in
pursuit of these efforts. Conversely, severe disruption to commerce or
infrastructure makes the unacceptable harm threshold more imminent, and so
reduces the obligation to pursue alternatives.
195. Westby, supra note 147, at 1-2.
196. W. Thomas Mallison & Sally V. Mallison, The Israeli Aerial Attack ofJune 7, 1981, upon
the Iraqi Nuclear Reactor: Aggression or Self-Defense?, 15 VAND. J. TRASNAT'L L. 417, 427-28 (1982)
(criticizing Israel for insufficient diplomacy prior to the attack to meet the necessity requirement).
197. Beth M. Polebaum, National Self-Defense in International Law: An Emerging Standard
for a Nuclear Age, 59 N.Y.U. L. REv. 189,198 (1984).
198. Schmitt, supra note 12, at 594 (indicating that, should passive cyber defenses be adequate
to thwart a cyber armed attack, forceful defensive measures would be disallowed).
199. Polebaum, supra note 197, at 198.
200. Id. at 198-99.
201. Hugill, supra note 132, at 6.
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Israel began seeking a diplomatic solution to the Egyptian 1967 blockade
the day after it was imposed, and resorted to military force after two weeks of
202
effort. Absent imminent invasion from Egypt and Syria, the low intensity of
Egypt's blockade meant that Israel's two-week diplomatic effort to open the
waterway would likely have been insufficient to meet the necessity
requirement. The availability of mitigating countermeasures may extend the
obligation to pursue alternatives to armed self-defense. For example, though the
Berlin Blockade was a prima facie threat to West Berlin's survival as an
independent polity, the ability of the United States Air Force to supply the city
by air meant that breaking the blockade with armed force would not have been
necessary. 203 Similarly, though Israel's oil supply may have been threatened by
Egypt's 1967 blockade of the Red Sea, if it were able to feasibly reroute oil
imports through land or Mediterranean ports, its obligation to pursue
diplomatic resolution, prior to resorting to armed self-defense, would rise.
Victims of Internet-disrupting cyber-attacks must undergo the same
calculus prior to lawful self-defense. The degree to which a state must pursue
alternatives before invoking its Article 51 rights depends not only on the
intensity of the cyber-blockade, but also on the likelihood that diplomatic, law
enforcement, or technological solutions can halt the ongoing aggression. When
faced with high-intensity DDoS attacks, the necessity principle would have
prevented Estonia (or its NATO allies) from resorting to armed self-defense
until it has exhausted mitigating countermeasures and diplomatic efforts. 204
It is hard to argue that Estonia did not exhaust mitigating
countermeasures. Elion, Estonia's primary telecommunications Internet
provider, frantically increased bandwidth at enormous expense in order to
accommodate the unprecedented level of data packets streaming through. 205
Ultimately, only by severing Estonia's Internet connection with the rest of the
206
world was Elion able to restore function. That countermeasure turned
imminent electronic infrastructure collapse into "merely" a cyber-severance, in
which Internet-dependent communications and financial interactions with the
outside world halted. Given Estonia's heavy reliance on international media
and markets, this is not an insubstantial burden. It does not constitute a defeat
of the armed attack, but merely a delay of its effects.
Nonetheless, because partial success of mitigating measures meant that
the imminence of suffering disastrous harms had receded, Estonia had a greater
duty to pursue diplomacy. Bilateral negotiations with Russia were a dead end,
as Moscow was neither willing to admit responsibility nor to provide
meaningful assistance. Similarly, Russia's position on the Security Council
202. NADAV SAFRAN, FROM WAR TO WAR: THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFRONTATION, 1948-1967,
at 287-93 (1969) (noting that the Israeli response was far less bellicose than expected, at least
immediately).
203. ALEXANDROV, supra note 14, at 237-38.
204. North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 7, art. 5 (stating that the invocation of Article 5 would
commit each ally to "action as it deems necessary").
205. Davis, supra note 2.
206. Id.
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limited the promise of effective U.N. action. Further, Estonia would have had
to appeal to European or NATO allies to exert diplomatic effort on Russia to
meet the necessity requirement. Fortunately, these attacks ended before the
limitations imposed on Estonia's self-defense rights by the necessity principle
207expired.
C. Proportionality in Self-Defense
Jus ad bellum proportionality requires that force used in self-defense be
proportional to the aggression that it seeks to halt.208Scholars have interpreted
this requirement to have both a functional and a quantitative element. 209
The functional element requires the scope of force used to be proportional
to the object of self-defense, and limits the use of armed force to the goal of
successful restoration of the status quo ante.210 The quantitative element
requires that a self-defense measure feature some degree of parity with
"quantitative" features of the armed attack. 2 1 1 These features may include scale
of force used, mode of attack, magnitude of damage, and geographic scope. 2 12
These two elements work together to ensure that self-defense is not a pretext
for impermissible conduct, such as aggression or retaliation. For example,
during the Six Day War, Israel's use of force in anticipatory self-defense
appears quantitatively proportional to the forces arrayed against it. However,
because force ultimately was used to annex territory, an objective beyond the
scope of halting an imminent attack, many judge Israel's action to have
violated functional proportionality. 2 13 Though contemporary scholars tend to
emphasize the functional element,214 the quantitative element continues to
pervade interstate dialog and ICJ deliberations.215 Because it is easier to
207. Id. (noting that the attacks ended on their own by mid-May).
208. Gardam, supra note 21, at 391.
209. See, e.g., Enzo Cannizzaro, Contextualizing Proportionality: Jus ad Bellum and Jus in
Bello in the Lebanese War, 88 INT'L R. RED CROSS 779, 781-83 (2006); see also Frederic L. Kirgis,
Some Proportionality Issues Raised by Israel's Use of Armed Force in Lebanon, AM. SOC'Y INT'L L.
INSIGHTS (2006) (Aug. 17, 2006), http://www.asil.org/insights060817.cftn ('"Proportionality' . . . could
mean either that the intensity of force used in self-defense must be about the same as the intensity
defended against, or ... is not designed to do anything more than protect the territorial integrity or other
vital interests of the defending party.").
210. WALDOCK, supra note 22, at 463-64; Gardam, supra note 21, at 404 (noting that
proportionality requires that force is used only against targets related to legitimate objectives).
211. See John Lawrence Hargrove, The Nicaragua Judgment and the Future of Law of Force
and Self Defense, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 135, 136 (1987) (noting that the ICJ focused its proportionality
analysis on the injury being inflicted).
212. DANIEL PATRICK O'CONNELL, THE INFLUENCE OF LAW ON SEA POWER 63 (1975)
(identifying geography as a factor); id. at 55-70 (praising quantitative proportionality with deescalating
conflicts at sea); Cannizzaro, supra note 209, at 783 (identifying scale, type of weaponry, and magnitude
of damage as quantitative factors).
213. KINGA TIBORI SZAB6, ANTICIPATORY ACTION IN SELF DEFENSE 148-49 (2011).
214. RUYS, supra note 11, at 112-13 (noting that "a majority of doctrine nonetheless rejects the
idea that the defensive action should necessarily be commensurate with the initial attack, holding that
this would deprive the victim State of effective protection," and showing resistance to quantitative
proportionality from many states).
215. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J.
14, 1 237 (June 27) (determining that U.S. actions against Nicaragua were disproportionate to the scale
of assistance that Nicaragua was providing to armed groups.); Oil Platforms, 2003 I.C.J. 90, 77
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measure, a violation of the quantitative dimension can be a useful signal for
identifying violations of functional proportionality. 2 16
In the case of the 2007 DDoS attacks against Estonia, the precise
limitations imposed by proportionality would have depended in large part on
whether or not the Russian state could have been held responsible. If Russian
responsibility could have been determined, then proportionality would have
required that Estonia and its allies used the minimum amount of force, and
inflicted the minimum amount of damage, necessary to defeat the ongoing
Russian armed attack. While the actual attackers are the most natural targets of
self-defensive uses of force, the nature of DDoS may mean that it would be
impossible or impermissible to strike at them. Massive denial-of-service attacks
by "hacktivist" armies may employ thousands of computers spread across many
cities.217 Because the amount of force necessary to neutralize thousands of
individual hackers may be quite high, quantitative proportionality may favor
instead targeting enabling infrastructure, such as a power station, or leadership
organs, such as agencies with ties to Nashi, in a good faith effort to compel the
218government to halt the ongoing cyber-attack. Furthermore, while self-
defense may theoretically be conducted with either physical or cyber
counterattacks, because cyber-operations are generally less destructive,
quantitative proportionality encourages self-defense over cyberspace, reserving
the option of resorting to physical force only if such measures proved
ineffective.
If the Russian state could not have be made responsible for directing
Nashi and affiliates, then self-defense measures would have been justifiable
only under an "unable or unwilling" doctrine. In this case, the ability of Estonia
(and its allies) to lawfully use force against the government would have
disappeared, as functional proportionality outlaws attacking targets that would
not halt the ongoing threat even if neutralized. In such a case, the ability to
lawfully target Internet infrastructure may disappear as well. Israel's use of
force during the 2006 Lebanon War, particularly the destruction of roads,
bridges, and other infrastructure outside of the area of hostilities, has been
heavily criticized for being disproportionate to the need of self-defense against
219Hezbollah. Some have defended Israel's action on the basis that Lebanon's
(declaring that Operation Praying Mantis-a naval action that destroyed two oil platforms used as radar
facilities and several Iranian warships-was not a proportional response to the mining of a U.S. frigate
on the basis that the mining caused neither sinking nor loss of life).
216. One example may be the destruction of civil infrastructure outside of Kuwait during the
First Gulf War. See Gardam, supra note 21, at 405 (weighing legitimate war aims against aerial
bombardment that caused "massive destruction of the infrastructure of the state" and concluding that
"more was done than was proportionate to expelling Iraq from Kuwait").
217. Cassell Bryan-Low & Siobhan Gorman, Inside the Anonymous Army of 'Hacktivist'
Attackers, WALL ST. J., June 23, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304887904576
399871831156018.html (estimating that "numbers [of hacktivists] swell into the thousands during
popular campaigns").
218. Schmitt, supra note 12, at 594 (arguing that when "the source of the cyber armed attack is
relatively invulnerable to cyber operations" proportionality "would not preclude kinetic or cyber
defensive operations against other targets in an effort to compel the attacker to desist").
219. Cannizzaro, supra note 209, at 784; Victor Kattan, Israel, Hezbollah and the Conflict in
Lebanon: An Act ofAggression or Self-Defense?, 14 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 26,29 (2006).
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transportation infrastructure enabled Hezbollah's resupply and thus was related
to the need of self-defense. 2 20 If true, this would make Israel's action legal
from a jus ad bellum perspective, but only if Israel had been able to provide
sufficient evidence to link roads and airports to the continuation of Hezbollah
221
aggression. Similarly, defensive measures against Russian Internet
infrastructure would have been permissible only if Estonia could have shown
that Nashi was using select servers to carry out its DDoS campaign, and that
disabling those servers would have halted the campaign.
Although the cyber-attacks against Estonia could be classified as armed
attacks giving rise to self-defense rights against Russia or groups within Russia,
customary international law would have placed significant limitations on legal
responses. Because Estonia did not exhaust diplomatic alternatives prior to the
self-termination of the armed attacks, necessity would not have permitted self-
defense during the actual duration of the attacks. Even if the attacks had
continued, proportionality would have cabined legal measures to non-lethal
force that would have been unlikely to escalate the conflict.
VI. THE INTEREST OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY
This final section argues that the self-defense approach advanced by this
Note better serves international peace and security than the kinetic effect
interpretation. Categorizing non-destructive cyber-attacks, such as DDoS
attacks, as conduct that can never rise to the level of armed attacks (and which
therefore remains ineligible for lawful self-defense) reduces the effectiveness
of deterrence, and so encourages countries with advanced cyber-warfare
capabilities to use them against vulnerable targets. Such a view also
delegitimizes defensive actions that could otherwise mitigate harms suffered by
the victim state. Recognizing that categorical disqualification of DDoS attacks
as armed attacks leads to perverse outcomes, an increasingly popular proposal
has emerged whereby victim states can nonetheless employ cyber
counterattacks to deter and defend against DDoS attacks, justifying them as
222
active defense under the law of countermeasures. However, such
countermeasures afford scant protection to weaker states, erode Article 2(4)'s
prohibition against the use of force, and cannot be properly implemented
against nonstate actors.
220. Schmitt, supra note 192, at 155.
221. Andreas Zimmermann, The Second Lebanon War: Jus ad Bellum. Jus in Bello and the
Issue ofProportionality, 11 MAX PLANCK Y.B. OF U.N. L. 99, 124-25 (2007) (noting that there may be a
case to lower the standard of proof to accommodate the ex ante lack of complete information).
222. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE STRATEGY FOR OPERATING IN
CYBERSPACE 7 (2011) [hereinafter DOD CYBER STRATEGY] (defining active cyber defense as the
"DoD's synchronized, real-time capability to discover, detect, analyze, and mitigate threats and
vulnerabilities"; whereas passive defense insulates one's own systems, active defense can include
counterattacks to neutralize computer networks responsible for attacks).
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A. The Need for Deterrence and Defense
After the 2007 DDoS attacks against Estonia, NATO considered whether
such conduct should or could be considered armed attacks in Bucharest in 2008
and categorized cyber-attacks as falling under Article 4 of the North Atlantic
Treaty.223 This signaled an initial unwillingness to categorize the non-kinetic
cyber-assault of the type faced by Estonia as armed attacks against which
224
collective action would be necessary.
It is well understood that the international law governing the scope of
self-defense must not be excessively permissive, lest self-defense be invoked as
a pretext for aggression. However, it is also important for self-defense
guidelines to avoid being over-restrictive. If victim states were unable to
respond lawfully with armed force against certain aggressive acts, would-be
aggressors would be encouraged to employ those tactics. Under the framework
proposed by NATO at Bucharest, Estonia lacked credible legal remedies.
Russia's powerful position and seat on the Security Council made diplomacy a
dead end, and because the ongoing DDoS attack could not be considered an
armed attack, individual and collective self-defense could not lawfully be
employed against aggressors, as it would have violated Article 2(4) of the U.N.
Charter.225 The only recourse available was for Tallinn to sever its connection
with the rest of the world and weather the electronic siege. 2 26
B. Active Defense Under the Law of Countermeasures
Kinetic-effect proponents recognize the limitation of their jus ad bellum
perspective in defending against and deterring cyber-attacks.227 They propose
that states can preserve deterrence and defense against cyber-attacks that
produce no kinetic effect under the law of countermeasures.228
Countermeasures are a unilateral self-help remedy by which an injured state
may suspend fulfillment of its legal obligations towards the wrongdoer in order
to end illegal conduct. 229 A victim state of a DDoS attack can suspend its own
obligation of noninterference and employ "active defense" against hostile
computer networks in the offending states.230 Countermeasures are lawful only
if they are proportional to the injury suffered.231 In the cyber context, this has
223. North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 7, art. 4.
224. Id.
225. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
226. Davis, supra note 2.
227. Hathaway et al., supra note 10, at 856.
228. Id. at 857; Matthew J. Sklerov, Solving the Dilemma ofState Responses to Cyberattacks: A
Justification for the Use of Active Defenses Against States Who Neglect Their Duty To Prevent, 201
MIL. L. REv. 1 (2009).
229. Draft Articles, supra note 8, at 128.
230. DoD CYBER STRATEGY, supra note 222, at 7; Hathaway et al., supra note 10, at 858;
Sklerov, supra note 228, at 25 ("Active defenses involve an in-kind response to a cyberattack-
effectively, a counter-cyberattack against the attacker's system, shutting down the attack before it can do
further harm and/or damaging the perpetrator's system to stop it from launching future attacks.").
231. Draft Articles, supra note 8, at 30.
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been interpreted as permitting reciprocal counter cyber-attacks against the
offending state. 232
The Department of Defense appears to have embraced the active defense
countermeasures approach.233 While this approach provides some defense and
deterrence against DDoS attacks-because only the victim state can respond-
still the level of defense and deterrence provided is inferior to that which a self-
defense approach offers. The countermeasure approach also negatively impacts
international peace and security by eroding the prohibition against using force.
Furthermore, it is unable to coherently justify active defense against nonstate
actors.
1. Providing Limited Protection to Vulnerable States
The international law of countermeasures only permits states that are
injured to respond to breaches.234 While these countermeasures can be effective
if the enacting state is powerful, they are not valuable remedies if the state is
small or weak. For instance, WTO countermeasures are inadequate remedies
for small countries to use against protectionist measures from large
countries.235 While the threat of retaliatory tariff from the European Union can
induce the United States to end protectionist measures, threat from a small
country is unlikely to have much of an effect. 23 6 Similarly, even if Estonia were
authorized to launch active defense countermeasures against Russian computer
networks, the vast gap in terms of size and cyber-warfare capabilities between
the two countries means that such efforts are unlikely to produce noticeable
effect.
A self-defense approach does not suffer from this defect. Article 51 of the
Charter recognizes the right of collective self-defense, and permits states to
come to the defense of allies who suffer armed attacks. 23 7 While Estonia may
be too weak to effectively respond to Russian cyber-aggression by itself, as a
NATO member, it can count on the support of powerful allies, including the
United States.238 Sophisticated responses in collective self-defense from
Estonia's allies are far more likely to halt an ongoing DDoS campaign by
disrupting aggressor computer networks, and more importantly, may deter
aggression in the first place. 239
232. Sklerov, supra note 228, at 25.
233. See DOD CYBER STRATEGY, supra note 222, at 7; DEP'T OF DEFENSE, QUADRENNIAL
DEFENSE REVIEW, at ix (2010).
234. See, e.g., Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. 14,
249 (stating that only "the State which had been the victim of [wrongful] acts" has the right to impose
proportionate countermeasures).
235. ROBERT CARBAUGH, INTERNATIONAL EcoNoMics 198 (2010).
236. Id.
237. U.N. Charter art. 51.
238. North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 7, art. 5.
239. Press Release, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Deterrence and Defence Posture
Review (May 20, 2012), http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official-texts_87597.htm?mode=pressrelease
(recognizing that the collective defense obligation under Article 5 serves an important deterrence
function).
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It is natural for countries with powerful cyber-defense and deterrence
capabilities, such as the United States, to favor a countermeasure approach over
self-defense.240 They can deter cyber-attacks and defend when deterrence fails.
At the same time, they can launch their own cyber-attacks against weaker
states-such as Estonia in 2007 or Iran in 2010-without fear of retaliation. 24 1
However, the interest of global security is not served when only the powerful
are protected against predation. To avoid Internet-based gunboat diplomacy, it
is necessary to replace the self-help countermeasures approach with individual
and collective self-defense.
2. Eroding the Prohibition Against the Use ofForce
The limited defense and deterrence that a countermeasure approach offers
comes at a steep price. Some effects-based scholars consider state-sponsored
DDoS attacks to constitute illegal uses of force that violate Article 2(4) of the
U.N. Charter.242 By this measure, a reciprocal active defense countermeasure
would also be a use of force, and therefore constitute a prima facie violation of
Article 2(4). The only exception to the Charter's prohibition against force is
self-defense in response to an armed attack.243 If the provoking DDoS attack is
not an armed attack, the active defense countermeasure is unlawful under the
U.N. Charter. Though the Nicaragua court suggested that forcible
countermeasures against illegal uses of force may be permissible,244 the Draft
Articles on state responsibility expressly rule out forcible countermeasures. 245
The prohibition against forcible countermeasures is consistent with declarations
by the Security Council,246 the General Assembly, 247 and the ICJ. 248 While the
Nicaragua decision has been cited for precedential value in subsequent cases
for many propositions-including the gravity threshold for armed attacks 24 9
and the effective control test for state responsibility250-no subsequent
240. Matthew C. Waxman, Cyber-Attacks and the Use ofForce: Back to the Future ofArticle
2(4), 36 YALE J. INT'L L. 421, 434-35 (2011).
241. See, e.g., Norman Asa, Cyberattacks on Iran-Stuxnet and Flame, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9,
2012, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/c/computermalware/stuxnet/index.html.
242. See, e.g., Schmitt, supra note 10, at 929; Waxman, supra note 240, at 432.
243. U.N. Charter art. 51.
244. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986
I.C.J. 14,1 210 (June 27).
245. Draft Articles, supra note 8, art. 50(l)(a) (listing "the obligation to refrain from the threat
or use of force as embodied in the Charter of the United Nations" as one of four fundamental obligations
that is not affected by countermeasures).
246. See S.C. Res. 11l, U.N. Doc. S/3538 (Jan. 19, 1956) (denying that Syrian interference
with Israeli activities in contravention of an armistice agreement justifies an Israeli military attack
against Syrian forces).
247. See Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, Annex,
U.N. Doc. A/8082 (Oct. 24, 1970).
248. See Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 35 (Apr. 9) (rejecting a British
attempt to justify the use of force as a lawful response to Albania's failure to carry out duties under
international law).
249. See, e.g., Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 90, 1 51 (Nov. 6).
250. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 2005 I.C.J.
168, 1160 (Dec. 19).
2013] 213
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
judgment has cited the decision for the idea that countermeasures can include
the use of force. This strongly indicates the Court's own recognition that its
position on forcible countermeasures was wrong and dangerous. The ex nihilo
creation of an exception to Article 2(4) encourages multiplicity of exceptions
when states find it convenient, and threatens to deconstruct the post-World War
IIjus ad bellum architecture.
The effort to classify non-destructive cyber-attacks as interventions rather
than uses of force in violation of Article 2(4) is even more destabilizing. 2 5 1
While such a position means that reciprocal countermeasures would also not
breach Article 2(4), it rests upon the premise that the acts of military officers
launching information warfare operations from military computers against
hostile networks overseas do not qualify as a use of military or armed force.
This is reminiscent of the legal fiction of classifying the use of warships to
blockade foreign ports as not warlike in order to legitimate pacific blockades.
Because pacific blockades were merely interventions that did not trigger the
legal consequences of war,25 2 Europeans nations with strong navies frequently
resorted to naval blockades as an instrument of statecraft against weaker
states.253 Similarly, if non-destructive cyber-attacks are merely interventions
rather than illegal uses of force, we can expect "pacific cyber-attacks" to
become a common instrument of statecraft for the strong to wield against the
weak. This would create a technological loophole to the U.N. jus ad bellum
framework. Given the magnitude of harm, such attacks can cause, especially
against small and wired societies such as Estonia, the consequences can be
catastrophic for international peace and security.
C. Problematic Application Against Nonstate Threats
Because the international law on countermeasures focuses on state-to-
state interactions, the legal coherence of active defense unravels when nonstate
actors are responsible. A lawful countermeasure is a suspension of a legal
obligation that is proportional to a breached obligation on the part of an
254
offending state. The active defense approach has interpreted the
proportionality requirement to favor cyber-counterattacks that are reciprocal to
255the initial breach. If the Internet blockade was carried out not by the
offending state, but by independent groups within that state, the breached
obligation is, at most, a failure to undertake sufficient effort to halt attacks. A
counterattack by the injured state against computer networks within the
251. See, e.g., Silver, supra 51, at 90.
252. Brownlie, supra note 103, at 188.
253. Between 1827 and 1903, pacific blockades were imposed upon Turkey, Portugal, Holland,
Colombia, Panama, Mexico, Argentina (twice), San Salvador, Nicaragua (twice), Greece (thrice), Sicily,
Brazil, Bolivia, China, Zanzibar, Siam, and Venezuela. See Davis & Engerman, supra note 102, at 188-
89. The blockading powers were Britain (twelve times), France (eleven times), Italy (thrice), Germany
(thrice), Russia (twice), Austria (twice) and Chile (once). See id.
254. See Draft Articles, supra note 8, art. 51.
255. See Hinkle, supra note 8, at 19.
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offending state would no longer be a reciprocal countermeasure, and would
likely be a disproportionate response to the breached obligation.
Suppose in 2007, Estonia traced attacks to Nashi but was unable to
demonstrate Russian responsibility.256 By being unwilling to cooperate with
Estonian authorities, Russia breached its obligation under customary
international law and under a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty to halt DDoS
attacks against Estonia from its territory. 257 A reciprocal response by Estonia
would be to suspend law enforcement efforts against groups that launch DDoS
attacks from Estonia into Russia. Active defense countermeasures, carried out
by the government of Estonia, against computer networks in Russia are not
reciprocal and likely violate the proportionality requirement of the Draft
Articles. 258 Not only would such efforts be inconsistent with the doctrine of
countermeasures, but they may also encourage the Kremlin to escalate the
conflict by launching its own responses against Tallinn, perhaps justified as a
countermeasure to Estonia's breach.
In contrast, the self-defense approach permits actions against nonstate
actors, and offers the "unable or unwilling" test and narrower jus ad bellum
proportionality requirements in such actions to ensure that they have sound
legal footing.259 A necessary and proportional response in self-defense against
the same sort of large-scale DDoS attack that was unleashed upon Estonia in
2007 may actually bear resemblance to active defenses authorized under the
countermeasure approach in form, but would be far more effective, for several
reasons. First, allies can assist the victim state; second, the self-defensive
approach does not undermine Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter; third, the
approach can be both effective and legitimate against nonstate actors.
VII. CONCLUSION
Similarities between naval blockades and DDoS attacks invite an analogy
for analytical purposes. Such an analysis suggests that that DDoS attacks can
be categorized as armed attacks for jus ad bellum purposes if their impacts on
the victim state are sufficiently severe. This Note assuages concerns that
allowing DDoS attack to qualify as armed attacks might jeopardize
international peace and security. Using the 2007 attack against Estonia as a
backdrop, it shows how principles governing the right of self-defense under
customary international law can reduce the risks of overreaction and conflict
escalation. The Note also demonstrates that refusing to permit lawful self-
defense against large-scale DDoS attacks corrodes international peace and
security by inadequately deterring cyberspace predation, and by relying on a
legal justification for defense and deterrence that undermines existing
256. For an account of the actual attack, see Davis, supra note 2.
257. Legal Assistance Treaty, supra note 146, art 3; Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949
I.C.J. 4, at 22 (Apr. 9) (holding that Albania had an "obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be
used for acts contrary to the rights of other states").
258. See Draft Articles, supra note 8, art. 51.
259. For an analysis of the "unwilling or unable" test, see Decks, supra note 191, at 506-32.
2013] 215
216 THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 38: 179
international law. While the 2007 DDoS attack against Estonia ended
reasonably rapidly, it offered a glimpse into the disruptive potential of cyber-
blockades. As the world becomes increasingly reliant upon cyberspace for
basic functions, that potential will inevitably rise. Though it was written in the
twentieth century, international law governing self-defense must be interpreted
through a twenty-first century lens to authorize self-defense against new ways
to cause destruction.
